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ANTITRUST LEGISLATION AND POLICY
IN GERMANY-A COMPARATIVE STUDY*
Ivo E. Schwartzt
At present, the German antitrust field is still regulated by several
decartelization and deconcentration laws enacted by the three occupation
powers in Western Germany. On May 5, 1955, the Bonn Conventions
terminated the occupation regime and transferred supreme authority
from the occupation authorities back to the German government. Under
the Conventions, Allied laws remain in force as long as they are not
replaced or repealed by the German legislature.' Now, the German
Draft Law Against Restraints of Competition' is to replace the Allied
decartelization law as Germany's own antitrust statute in accordance
with present circumstances and the economic policy of the Adenauer
* I am deeply indebted to Dean Edward S. Mason of the Graduate School of Public
Administration, Harvard University, as well as to Professors Lon L. Fuller, Donald F.
Turner and, particularly, Professor Kingman Brewster, Jr., of Harvard Law School.
The paper has also benefited from many helpful suggestions of my friend Ernest
Lamp-, Member, New York Bar; LL.B., 1941, Harvard.
t Referendar, 1952, University of Freiburg; Assessor, 1955, Germany; LL.M.,
1956, Harvard University.
1. See pp. 647-48 infra.
2. Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbechraenkungen, DETrTscHER
BUNDESTAG DRUCKSAcHE No. 3462, 1. Wahlperiode (1949); DEUTSCHER BUMDESTAG
DRUCESACHE No. 1158, 2. Wahlperiode app. 1 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Draft Law).
The text of the draft law, with an unofficial English translation, is reprinted 1 & 2
WIPVscHAn UND W .vZrnSVZa [hereinafter W.W.] 432-59, 543 (Germany 1952). The
English translation is reprinted in ANTI-TRUST LAws, A COMPARAinV SYMPOSIUM
191-229 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium vol. 3, Friedmann ed.
1956).
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administration. Moreover, the law will be the basic economic statute
of the country.
THE GERMAN DRAFT LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
The bill was initiated by the federal administration and introduced
in the legislative bodies in 1952. Since that time, the draft has been
widely discussed in several committees of the Bundestag (the lower
and dominant house of the legislature in the German Federal Republic),
the Bundesrat (the upper house), in numerous industrial bodies and
in the public generally. For lack of time, the bill did not pass the
First Bundestag prior to September 1953, when national elections
took place. But now it is probable that the legislative bodies will
enact the bill before the next national elections in the fall of 1957.
The draft law is intended to cover the whole antitrust field by its
eighty sections. In terms of American antitrust law, the bill deals
with substantially all the problems arising under the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and their amend-
ments. The proposed bill, however, does not encompass the law of
unfair competition, which is already regulated in another statute,3 nor
does it contain general provisions against price discrimination com-
parable to those of the Robinson-Patman Act.4
Basic Concepts
The public policy upon which the draft law is based is very
similar to that underlying the antitrust laws of the United States
as interpreted by the federal courts.5 In principle, the proposed law
outlaws horizontal agreements in restraint of competition for the first
time in German economic history.' It is true that this newly introduced
principle of cartel prohibition per se is subject to some exceptions.'
But in principle the draft abandons the pattern of previous German
antitrust law, which was based upon the concept of cartel control
exercised by an administrative agency. Under the latter concept, cartels
were subject to governmental interference only if they abused their
3. Law Against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb)
of June 7, 1909, [19091 RMc1sG]s'TZBLATT (official law gazette of the Reich)
[hereinafter R.G.B.] 499 (Germany). See also pp. 631-32 infra.
4. See comment by Fikentscher, Germany: Proposed Antitrust Legislation and
Price Discrimination, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 523 (1953).
5. See Friedmann, Anti-Monopoly Law-Some Comparative Observations in
FESTSCHVIT F UR ERNST RABEL 453, 462-68 (Doelle, Rheinstein & Zweigert eds. 1954) ;
cf. Fikentscher, Die neuere Entwicklung des amerikanischen. Wettbewerbsrechts
und der deutsche Kartellgesetzentwurf, 17 ZEITSCHPaIFr FUR DAS GESAMTE HANFDL-
SW CHET usxD KoNrcRsa rciT [hereinafter Z.G.H.K.] 1 (Germany 1955).
6. Draft Law pt. 1, § 1.
7. Id. arts. 2-5. See pp. 656-62 infra.
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economic power-in other words, if they were "bad" or "unreasonable"
or "unjustified." Both in theory and practice there is a fundamental
difference between these two concepts, which this paper will discuss in
order to explain the new policy underlying the draft law.
At the outset, however, the meaning of "cartel" should be
clarified. As the monopoly and the restraint of trade concepts have
become a matter of great concern to American lawyers and economists,
so has the cartel concept in Germany. Although there has been much
discussion of the term "cartel," there has been no legal definition. There
is no complete agreement among German economists and lawyers,
but a review of leading literature seems to me to justify the following
definition:
A cartel is an agreement by or an association of independent
enterprises engaged on the same level and in the same field of
business formed for the common purpose of influencing collectively
the market by regulating its competition.'
Thus, three factors are essential. First, a cartel is always a
horizontal combination, i.e., between enterprises on the same economic
level. Second, the members of the cartel remain-at least legally-
independent entities, whereas in "trusts" and communities of interests
(both called Konzerne in Germany) the constituent enterprises lose
their legal or economic independence or both. Third, the cartel
members have the common purpose of influencing the market through
the regulation of competition.
Typical objectives and practices of cartels are: price-fixing
(Preiskartell); restriction of production by allocating quotas to the
individual members (Kontingentierungskartell); fixing of terms of
payment and delivery (Konditionenkartell), standardization of prod-
ucts and rationalization of production (Fertigungs und Rationalisie-
rungskartell) ; division of fields of operation and market areas (espe-
cially in the international field (Gebietskartell)) ; and control and limita-
tion of the use of inventions by restrictive patent-licensing agreements.
Under the ordinary cartel agreement the execution of these ob-
jectives is left to the individual cartel members who continue to deal
directly with their customers.9 Often, however, it is considered desir-
8. Cf. 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS § 15.3, at 217 n.32
(2d ed. 1950); CALLMANN, DAS DEUTSCHE KARTELLRECHET 78-79, 87 (1934);
1 HThER, WIRTSCHAFTSVERRWALTUNGSRECHT 284 (2d ed. 1953) (hereinafter cited as
HiBER); LIEFMANN, KARTELLE, KONZERNE UND TRUSTS 9 (8th ed. 1930).
9. Example: The steel manufacturers of a certain district form an association to
maintain prices and to limit production. The members of the association agree not to
produce more than a certain amount of steel per year and to charge agreed prices.
Another example is the Woodpulp case, discussed at pp. 626-29 infra.
'620 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
able by the contracting parties to provide for the centralization of all
sales of products manufactured by the cartel members in one sales
agency, which is usually a new corporation formed by the group. The
cartel members retain their own legal personalities and, usually, sub-
scribe pro rata to the stock of the incorporated sales agency.'
0
The legal form of the organization is not determinative of the
question whether or not a cartel exists. A "gentlemen's agreement"
is sufficient, as is the loose form of a civil law association (Gesellschaft
des biirgerlichen Rechts)"1 and the forms of the corporation law.
In the United States, cartels are better known under the term "loose
combinations."
There can be no doubt that cartels in general restrict rather than
promote trade and competition. They are a form of private regula-
tion of business which seeks to divide and rule industry on the basis
of economic privilege of their members as against outsiders and
newcomers who do not want to join them. Big cartels generally have
a tendency to dominate the market. On the other hand, very few
cartels in Germany really acquired monopoly power; most could not
even hope to become an important factor in their markets. Actually,
the main purpose in most cases was protection against the risks of
free (often called "ruinous") competition and the dangers of economic
crisis." It is significant that the German cartel movement began as
a consequence of such a crisis.'" To these rather defensive aims later
came other purposes and practices going far beyond the prevention of
"ruinous" competition, often opposing any kind of free competition and
trade.
At the same time, monopoly power can be acquired by means other
than cartelization. A single enterprise can also acquire a monopolistic
position and abuse its dominating power against its customers. The
draft law, therefore, provides a control on single monopolistic or even
oligopolistic enterprises.' 4 To the extent that an enterprise is not
faced by any substantial competition in certain types of goods or
10. Example: The coal producers of northwestern Germany established an in-
corporated sales agency for centralization of all sales of their coal. The members of the
association bound themselves to turn over their entire output at a fixed price to the
sales agency which, in turn, sold to the public. The net profits were divided among the
members of the association in proportion to output. This was the so-called Rhenanian-
Westphalian Coal Syndicate. Cf. decision of the Reichsgericht (the former Supreme
Imperial Court) (III. Zivilsenat), Feb. 19, 1901, 48 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts
in Zivilsachen [hereinafter R-G.Z.] 305.
11. See 2 STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR Zum BORGmUCHEN GESEurZBUcH § 705 (9th
ed. 1929).
12. See 1 HuBXR 289-90.
13. See p. 625 infra.
14. Draft Law pt. 1, § 3, arts. 17-22.
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commercial services, the Cartel Authority may prohibit such enter-
prise from demanding or offering prices and doing certain other acts
in abuse of its dominant position.' 5
Monopoly power can also be acquired by merger of two or more
enterprises. Therefore, the draft law requires permission for certain
prospective mergers. The Cartel Authority must refuse permission if,
as a consequence of the merger, the combined enterprises would acquire
domination of the national market.'"
Thus, the draft law is governed by two basic principles: (1)
cartel agreements are prohibited per se by statutory provision; (2)
single enterprises which dominate the market are not prohibited
but are subjected to control by an administrative agency. With
respect to mergers which would dominate the national market the
draft law goes further: it directs the controlling agency to refuse
the requisite permission.
The Main Controversy: Cartel Prohibition or Cartel Control?
The principle of cartel prohibition, introduced for the first time
by a German statute, is of particular interest. While there is no
longer doubt even in industrial circles that there is need for some
degree of control against restraints of trade, in particular with respect
to monopolistic enterprises abusing their dominating power, the prohibi-
tion of cartels per se is highly controversial. It provoked violent op-
position, especially on the part of "heavy" industry.' Some German
trade unions and the German association of trade unions (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund) have also opposed a prohibition of cartels. Like
the industry, they want the re-establishment of mere cartel control by
the government.'" Thirty members of the Bundestag introduced their
15. Id. art. 17.
16. Id. art. 18(1), (2).
17. See the numerous amendments of the draft law as proposed by the repre-
sentatives of the Federal Association of German Industries to the Federal Ministry
of Economics, Oct. 18, 1954, partly reprinted in DRUCKSACHrE No. 33 of the asso-
ciation (Germany 1955). See also the "Ten Theses" of the president of the associ-
ation, Mr. Fritz Berg, in a letter to the Federal Minister of Economics, Mr. Erhard,
Oct. 16, 1952, reprinted in Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung, Oct. 29, 1952
and in 1 HuBXR 395-96. However, the administration did not yield to the demands
of the association and other interested parties. Cf. 2 id. at 768.
A modified position has been taken by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft selbstandiger
Unternehmer (Association of Independent Entrepreneurs) in its resolution of April
1955, reprinted in 5 W.W. 589-90 (Germany 1955). The resolution supports the per
se concept of the administration's draft law in principle. However, it proposes more
exceptions from the cartel prohibition. Moreover, the resolution demands a much
more vigorous control of enterprises which dominate the market. Thus, it goes be-
yond the regulation as provided in the draft. However, the power and importance of
this association seems to be little as contrasted with the Bundesverband der deutschen
Industrie (Federal Association of German Industries).
18. Resolution of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund of April 29, 1953, published
in 3 W.W. 362 (Germany 1955). See also 1 HtmFa 395; 2 id. at 767-68.
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own bill which generally permits cartel agreements and provides only
for control of abuses." Twenty liberal members countered by intro-
ducing a third version containing even more vigorous provisions against
restraints of trade than does the administration's proposal.'
However, many members of the present Adenauer party coalition,
as well as-and to an even greater extent-the Social Democrat op-
position party, generally support the administration's draft law outlaw-
ing cartels.2 The Bundesrat (upper house), by a tight majority, also
accepted the basic concept of the draft law in a preliminary review.
However, it objected that the law does not grant protection against
"ruinous competition" and recommended amendments accordingly
with regard to that and some other aspects
2
The Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbiinde (association
of the associations of consumers) clearly supports the administration
draft law.-3 However, what the public really thinks on the bill is not
19. Entwurf der Abgeordneten H6cherl und Genossen of March 11, 1955,
DPUTscHmn BUNDESTAG DRucKSACH No. 1253, 2. Wablperiode (1953).
20. Entwurf der Abgeordneten Bohm und Genossen of March 16, 1955,
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACiaE No. 1269, 2. Wahlperiode (1953), reprinted in
5 W.W. 319-27 (Germany 1955); cf. Mestmacker, Der Bohm Entzmrf eines
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, 5 W.W. 285 (Germany 1955).
21. The draft law was read for the first time by the Second Deutsche Bundes-
tag (lower house) in its 76th and 77th sessions, on May 24 and 31, 1955. See Doer-
inkel, Abriss der ersten Lesung des Kartellgesetzentzmwrfes in; Bundestag, 5 W.W.
573 (Germany 1955). The draft then was sent to several committees of the Lower
House. From summer '1955 to summer 1956, the Economic Policy Committee of the
Lower House discussed the draft and proposed numerous amendments, some of
which would weaken the draft considerably. However, it approved the principle of
cartel prohibition (Draft Law art. 1). It also approved the principle of control of
individual monopoly and oligopoly enterprises which abuse their economic power
(id. art. 17) and the prevention of certain mergers (id. art. 18), discussed at pp. 676-82
infra. For the wording of the proposed amendments and for other information on
the discussion, see 5 W.W. 782 (Germany 1955); 6 W.W. 60-61, 148-49, 271-72,
351-52 (Germany 1956), and the current issues of the periodical. However, these
proposals are not final and the Economic Policy Committee is discussing them anew
since fall 1956. The draft law is also discussed in several other committees and it,
as well as all amendments, is subject to the approval of the Lower House when the
bill is read for the second and third time. Cf. Kuehne, The West Gerimo; Cartel
Bill, 6 CARTEL, RZVIw Ov MONOPOLY DEMVOPt14NTS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
[hereinafter CARTEL] 48 (1956). The amendments as proposed by the Traffic Com-
mittee of the Lower House are reprinted in 6 W.W. 224-25 (Germany 1956). As to the
Committee for Agriculture, see 6 W.W. 668-70 (Germany 1956). See also the cur-
rent German newspapers.
22. Resolution and proposals of the Deutscher Bundesrat of May 21, 1954, BUNDzs-
RATs DRUcKSAcHia Nos. 53, 54, Sess. No. 123. See also Doerinkel, Der Bundesrat sum
Entvurf des Kartellgesetzes, 4 W.W. 433 (Germany 1954); Doerinkel, Die Beratung
des Kartellgesetzentwnrfes im Bundesrat, 4 W.W. 440 (Germany 1954). The opinion
of the federal administration on the amendments proposed by the Bundesrat is printed
in BUNDESTAG DRUCKSAcnE No. 1158, 2. Wahlperiode app. 3, at 50 (1953). It is re-
printed in 5 W.W. 313-18 (Germany 1955). See also the press release of the adminis-
tration in Bulletin (a weekly survey of German affairs issued by the Press and
Information Office of the German federal government) No. 26, Feb. 8, 1955, p. 21,
reprinted in 5 W.W. 190 (Germany 1955).
23. Resolution of the Association of April & May 1955, reprinted in 5 W.W. 790-92
(Germany 1955). The Central Association of the German Handwerk also supports the
basic concepts of the draft law. See Note, Handwerk und Kartellgesetzgebung, 6 W.W.
144 (Germany 1956).
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known."a Public opinion will probably be divided. This is even
more true as to the views of German economists and lawyers. 4
The German proponents of mere cartel control by an administra-
tive agency argue, in brief, as follows: cartel agreements in restraint
of competition should not be outlawed per se when trusts and single
enterprises are only subject to case-to-case control. There is, it is
said, no reason for such different treatment; it is not at all necessary
to abandon the traditional European way to deal with cartels by
merely controlling their activities. On the contrary, actually there
are "good" or "reasonable" cartels which may even improve rationali-
zation and automation, promote technical and social progress, and
which may present or soften economic crisis by maintaining price
levels and wages. Cartels also are said to be necessary for export
purposes. The draft law itself, it is contended, in providing limited
exceptions for rationalization, crisis and export cartels, recognizes
that there are "good" cartels. To proponents of mere control, this
seems a contradiction in principle. Moreover, they say, to outlaw
cartels would unconstitutionally violate freedom of contract and asso-
ciation. 5 The conclusion is that, on the whole, it would be not only
23a. For an excellent description of the general public attitude toward the desirabil-
ity and the possibility of preserving competition in Germany, see Boehm, Monopoly and
Competition in Western Germany, in MONOPOLY AND ComPETTIoN AD Tunm RGuLA-
TION 141, 152-67 (Chamberlin ed. 1954). Boehm takes a rather pessimistic view on
German public opinion regarding a vigorous antitrust policy of which he is a leading
proponent See his own antitrust draft law, note 20 supra, which is also discussed at
present by several committees of the Lower House. Most of the German newspapers
clearly support the draft law. With respect to the general public attitude in the
United States, see Clark, Competition and the Objectives of Government Policy in
MONOPOLY AND CO MPETITION AND TEIm REGULATION 317 (Chamberlin ed. 1954).
Clark says there is "a tendency to over-stress the differences between American and
European views on competition and monopoly." Id. at 336. See also Scitovsky,
Monopoly and Competition in Europe and America, 69 QJ. EcoN. 607 (1955).
24. See excellent survey by Fikentscher, Die deutsche Kartellrechtswissenschaft
1945-1954, Eine kritische Ubersicht, 5 W.W. 205, with summary in English at 228-29
(Germany 1955) ; cf. Faic x, KOLLEKTiVmONOPOLE (1956); WAGNER, DIE DIsKussiON
uEDER EIN GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRAENKU.NGEN (1956). See particularly
3 GuTAcnTEN DES WISSENSCE[AFTLIC EN BEImATS BEIm BUNDESmINISTER FUER
WmTscniAFr (Opinion of the Academic Advisory Council to the Federal Ministry of
Economics) (1955). The Council clearly supports the draft law. A summary of its
opinion and recommendations is reprinted in 5 W.W. 488 (1955). See also the articles
of Benisch, von Brunn, Forsthoff, von Katzler, Metzner, Moehring, Ottel and
Zweigert, in BEITAEGE ztrm WIRTscHA:TSmHT, FESTSCHRI T FUEr RUDOLF ISAY
(Reimer ed. 1956).
25. For a survey, see Benisch, Ist das Kartellverbot grundgesetawidrig? Rine
systernatische Gegeniiberstellung der wissenschaftlichen Standpunkte (Is the Prohibi-
tion of Cartels Unconstitutional? A Systematic Confrontation of the Different Scien-
tific Views), 9 DER BETIE 37 (Germany 1956). Of particular interest are the de-
cision of the Federal Supreme Constitutional Court, July 20, 1954, 4 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 7; HURa, DIE VEaRASSUNGS PROBLEMATIK EINFs
KARTELLVERBOTS (The Constitutional Problematic of a Prohibition of Cartels) (1955);
NIPPERDEY, Dm SoZIAI. MARKTWIRTSCHAFT IN DER VERFASSUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
(The Social Market Economy Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic)
(1954); Bohm, Verstoesst ein gesetzliches Kartellverbot gegen das Grundgesetz?
(Does a Prohibition of Cartels Violate the Constitution?), 6 W.W. 173 (Germany
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sufficient but also more reasonable and just merely to protect cus-
tomers and the public against "bad" or "unjustified" cartels.
The whole controversy concentrates on the question: should
cartels be prohibited outright, or should they be condemned only to
the extent that they have harmful effects on the public interest and on
different classes within the community, as it is provided for enter-
prises which dominate the market? The latter view has been gen-
erally taken by the other European industrial countries26 and by
the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization27 and
the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices' report
to the Economic Council of the United Nations,2 which contains
proposals for the control of restrictive business practices affecting in-
ternational trade.2" However, the draft of the treaty constituting a
common market of the six Schuman-plan countries provides in article
42 for a per se prohibition of cartels which is subject to certain
exceptions.
The problem of mere cartel control or prohibition per se seems
to be indeed the central question to be solved by any antitrust legislation.
And the problem is not only to make a choice between two different
legal techniques resulting in similar effects. The decision to be made,
rather, is one between different economic, social and public policies.
1956); Huber, Der Streit urn das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht (The Dispute on the
Constitutional Law Concerning the Economy), 9 DIE OEFFENTLICHrE VERWALTUNG
97, 135, 172, 200 (Germany 1956).
26. For a brief review on previous development and present antitrust legislation in
Europe, America and other regions of the world, see Timberg, Restrictive Business
Practices, Comparative Legislation and the Problems That Lie Ahead, 2 AM. J. ComP.
L. 445 (1953); Friedmann, A Comparative Analysis, in ANTi-TRusT LAws, A
ComrARvz SYm Posium 519 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium vol.
3, Friedmann ed. 1956). The Symposium also contains articles on the antitrust laws of
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, United
Kingdom and the United States. See also Deak, Contracts and Combinations in Restraint
of Trade in French Lau-A Comparative Study, 21 IowA L. Rxv. 397, 430, 434-35, 441,
448-54 (1936); Kronstein & Leighton, Cartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YALE
L.J. 297 (1946); Wolff, Business Monopolies: Three European Systems in Their
Bearing on American Law [French, English and German], 9 Tur.. L. REv. 325 (1935) ;
Note, The Antecedents of the Proposed German Law Against Restraints of Competition,
3 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 348 (1954). Much valuable material as to facts, laws, cases and
writings on cartels and trusts in Europe will be found in FRIEDLANDiR, Diz RtHcT-
SPRAXIS DiR KARZI.m UND KONZmRN IN EUROPA (1938) ; NiWmMAN, PUBLIC CONTROL
op Busi=,ss, AN INTZRNATIoNAL APPROACH (1956) (hereinafter cited as NEWMAN).
The latter also collects non-European materials. See also the comparative historical
study by ISAY, DIE GESCICETE DER KARTELLGESETZGEBUNGEN (The History of the"
Antitrust Legislations) (1955).
27. Resolution of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. EcoNoMIc
AND SOCIAL CouNcI Opp. R.., 6th Sess., Annex (Doc. No. E1717) (1948).
28. U.N. EcoNoMIc AND SoCIA.L CoUNcIL OV. Ric., 16th Sess., Supp. Nos. 11-A
& B (1953), the latter of which contains the texts of most antitrust laws exifting in the
world.
29. See Timberg, supra note 26, at 464; ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARA
SyMPosIUm 561-78 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium vol. 3, Fried-
mann ed. 1956) (draft articles of the agreement). See also Kamberg, Probleme Inter-
nationale Kartellkontrolle, 6 W.W. 530 (Germany 1956).
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It affects the structure of the whole economy and society of a country
considerably. Germany's past seems to be a striking example of the
correctness of this contention. The whole controversy, its solution
and the importance of the draft law breaking with a long tradition
can scarcely be fully understood without reviewing in brief the previous
as well as the existing legal and economic situation in Germany.
THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN CARTEL AND TRUST MOVEMENT AND
THE PREVIOUS ANTITRUST LAW
1870 to 1923: The Concept of Limited Freedom of Cartels
Economic liberalism replaced the old guild system in Germany
during the first third of the nineteenth century. Industrialization began
and progressed rapidly; large-scale enterprise and mass-production
developed during the second third of the century. An ever increasing
number of producers and manufacturers established themselves in
every line of business, and competition was steadily becoming more
intense. When, in 1873, an economic crisis occurred, business reacted
by beginning to organize itself in order to stabilize the markets and
to prevent ruin of the individual firms. The first epoch of the cartel
movement began. Protected against foreign imports by high tariffs,
German industry developed into one of the most powerful in Europe."°
In Germany, even after 1890, there was no statute like the
Sherman Act prohibiting contracts, combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade. Prior to 1923 the only general statutory provision
relating to trade was section 1 of the Trade Regulation Act of 1869,31
which provides: "All trade is open to everyone, unless this statute
provides exceptions from or limitations upon this rule." This pro-
30. Cf. CALLmAN, DAs DE TscHE ICKARTELLRECHT 58 (1934); Kronstein, The
Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents, 9 U. CEI. L. REV. 643 (1942); Wolff,
supra note 26, at 326-27.
31. Trade Regulation Act for the .North German Confederation (Gewerbeordnung
ffir den Norddeutschen Bund) of June 21, 1869, § 1, [1869] BUNDESGESETZBLATT FIER
DE " NORDDEUTSCEEN BuND 245. The first Prussian enactment with respect to free-
dom of trade will be found in a licensing and tax edict of Nov. 2, 1810, [1810-1813]
PapussxscEa G SZFSSAMMLUNG [hereinafter P.G.E.] pt. 1, at 79 and in the Trade
Regulation Act of Sept. 7, 1811, [1810-1813] P.G.E. 264, supplementing the edict of
Nov. 2, 1810. This principle of freedom of trade, newly introduced in Prussia, was
embodied in said Trade Regulation Act of 1869 of the North German League. It was
subsequently adopted as a Reich statute by Law of April 16, 1871, § 2, [1871] R.G.B.
63 (Germany). Many of its provisions--except § I were repeatedly amended. The act
was finally adopted in modified form by the Federal Republic of Germany by Law 61
Sept. 29, 1953, [1953] BuNDESGEsETzBLATr [hereinafter B.G.B] pt. I, at 1459 (Ger-
many). For a comprehensive presentation of history, scope and meaning of § 1 of the
act and of the decisions thereunder, see 1 LANDmANN, RoHmER, EymariTx &
FROSHLZm, GvAR BOaNurN, KoMMXN rAR 1-113 (11th ed. 1956). The two volumes of
the Kommentar also reproduce the full text of the act, as amended, and all related
statutes.
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vision enacts into law the leading economic postulate of freedom of
trade. It was the result and the legal coronation of the era of economic
liberalism; the act was to protect its achievements. Thus, the question
soon arose whether the provision was applicable to restraints of trade
caused by cartels, which grew more numerous and more powerful during
the last twenty years of the nineteenth century.
The Woodpulp Case: "Good" Cartels
The basis of all later judicial decisions on this question is the
famous and controversial 32 case of B. v. Saon Woodpulps Manu-
facturers Ass'n, decided by the Reichsgericht (the former German
Supreme Court) in 1897. The facts were as follows:
A substantial number of the Saxon woodpulp manufacturers
formed an association for the purpose of ending ruinous competition
and securing a reasonable price for their products. The members
agreed under penalty to sell their products exclusively through a
central sales agency. The defendant member, in violation of the
agreement, sold directly to paper factories. When sued by the associa-
tion, the defendant pleaded invalidity of the agreement as violative of
the principle of freedom of trade.
The court considered the issue of freedom of trade in two distinct
aspects: first, whether the cartel contract violated section 1 of the
Trade Regulation Act insofar as that provision sought to promote the
interests of society in general; and second, whether the personal
liberty of the individual is impaired by such contracts in a manner
contrary to the act.
The first question was answered in the negative. The court
reasoned:
"When the prices of the products of an industry fall to an
unreasonably low level and the profitable operation of the industry
is thereby endangered or made impossible, the resulting crisis is
detrimental not only to the individual affected but also to the
national economy. It is, therefore, to the interest of society that
prices should not fall to an unreasonably low level. The legisla-
ture has clearly recognized this by enacting protective tariff laws
designed to raise the price of certain products. It follows that it
cannot be generally considered contrary to the public welfare for
producers or manufacturers to combine with a view to preventing
32. See Euc=N, GRUNDSATZX DR WIRTSCHAsrPOLITIK (Principles of Economic
Policy) 170 (1952); 1 HBER 316-19; Bohm, Das Reichsgericht und die Kartelle, 1
Oao 197 (Germany 1948); Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 26, at 302-03; Roper,
Der Wirtschaftliche Hintergrund der Kartell-Legalisierung durch das Reichsgericht
(The Economic Background of the Legalization of Cartels by the Reichsgericht), 3
Onno 238 (Germany 1950); Wolff, supra note 26, at 330-38.
33. B. v. den Sichsischen Holzstoff-Fabrikanten-Verband, Reichsgericht (VI. Zivil-
senat), Feb. 4, 1897, 38 R.G.Z. 155.
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the consequent slump in prices. On the contrary, when prices
continue to be so low that business men are threatened with ruin,
combination is not merely a legitimate means of self-preservation
but also serves the public interest. The formation of syndicates
and cartels, such as the one here involved, has been suggested in
many quarters as a means especially well adapted, if reasonably
applied to economy in general, to render a service in the preven-
tion of uneconomic and wasteful overproduction, working at losses,
and the catastrophies arising therefrom. . . . Therefore cartel
contracts can be objected to only from the viewpoint of public
interest protected by freedom of trade, where they raise objections
under the special circumstances of the individual case, particularly
where the purpose of the cartel is to create monopoly and to
exploit the consumers or where monopoly and exploitation of
consumers actually result from the operation of such cartels." "
The second question, whether the law also protects individuals
against private interference through cartel contracts, was also answered
in the negative. The court held that section 1 of the Trade Regulation
Act should not be interpreted so as to deprive the individual of the
right to enter into contracts whereby he restricts himself with reference
to where and how he will conduct his business, provided that his
economic freedom is only temporarily limited and not permanently
destroyed.3 5
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail "
the correctness of the Reichsgericht's economic analysis of the cartel
problem. At the least, the analysis seems very brief and abstract. The
court does not at all refer to the particular economic situation of the
Saxon woodpulp manufacturers at that time. The facts stated in the
case do not permit conclusions as to the economic power of the cartel
in the market, the exercise of this power with regard to price fixing
34. Id. at 157-58. (Emphasis added.) See also M. v. M., Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat),
June 25, 1890, 28 R.G.Z. 238, 243-48; decision of the Bayrisches Oberstes Landesgericht
(highest court of the state of Bavaria), April 7, 1888, 12 Entscheidungen des
Bayriscben Ob. L.G. im Civilrecht und Civilprocezess [hereinafter B.L.G.] 67, re-
printed in Seuffert's Archiv fur Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen
Staaten No. 13 (hereinafter cited as Seuffert's Archiv) ; decision of the Oberlandes-
gericht Dresden (appellate court of the state of Saxony in Dresden) (III. Zivilsenat),
Sept. 19, 1893, 4 Hoffmann & Wulfert, Sachsisches Archiv ffir Burgerliches Recht und
Prozess 303.
35. 38 R.G.Z. at 158-59. See also decision of the Reichsoberhandelsgericht (prede-
cessor of the Reichsgericht in commercial matters), Dec. 22, 1875, 12 Entscheidungen
des Reichsoberhandelsgericht 29, 32 Seuffert's Archiv No. 310, at 401; plenary de-
cision of the Kdniglich Preussische Obertribunals (the former Prussian Supreme
Court), July 9, 1877, 80 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Obertribunal 1; decision of
same court (VI. Senat), Sept. 27, 1877, 34 Seuffert's Archiv No. 105, at 159; decision
of the Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), Dec. 5, 1879, 1 R.G.Z. 22; decision of the
Reichsgericht (V. Zivilsenat), Feb. 7, 1880, 35 Seuffert's Archiv No. 196, at 283;
decision of the Reichsgericht (III. Zivilsenat), May 19, 1893, 31 R.G.Z. 97.
36. Cf. authorities cited in note 32 supra.
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and output regulation or the business conditions in general. But the
Reichsgericht obviously had in mind the type of economic crisis which
often leads to the establishment of a so-called "crisis-cartel," directed to
avoid "ruinous" competition.
There appears, indeed, some justification for such an emergency
cartel if it is necessary to prevent the closing down of plants and if the
crisis is due to a temporary decline of sales or prices which is not based
on a fundamental change in the demand. The best known example of
such a situation in the United States is the Appalachian Coals case,"
where the Supreme Court, too, applied the rule of reason to the estab-
lished coal cartel, and thus made a rare exception from the general rule
that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se.3 However, this
decision was based on a detailed analysis of the extraordinary circum-
stances of the case and actually remained an exception from the rule.
In the Woodpulp case, on the other hand, the stated facts do not
establish such an extraordinary situation. Instead, it seems that the
Reichsgericht saw in the case the usual situation. In any event, the
Woodpulp decision has subsequently been interpreted not as an ex-
ception but rather as having admitted in principle all types of cartels,
if reasonable.
Thus, the Woodpulp decision has become the cornerstone of the
German cartel development. In recognizing in principle the reason-
ableness of cartels, the decision was supported by most economists of
that time.3
But the case has still another important aspect. Having once
introduced the doctrine of "good" cartels and thus having eliminated
considerations of economic policy, the Reichsgericht saw no reasons for
interpreting freedom of trade in a manner inconsistent with the
legislative history 40 and precedents."'
Accordingly, section 1 of the Trade Regulation Act merely
proclaimed freedom of trade vis-d-vis the government, i.e., freedom
from governmental interference with business-the old liberal doctrine.
Thus, freedom of trade did not also mean freedom from interference
by private individuals or groups of individuals.' It did not mean
37. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). For a further
discussion of the case, see p. 657 infra.
38. The exception was made under the guise of a finding that "price-fixing" did
not in fact result.
39. Cf. the economists cited in the Woodpulp case, Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat),
Feb. 4, 1897, 38 R.G.Z. 155, 158 and the authorities cited in note 32 supra.
40. See wording of § 1 of the Trade Regulation Act of 1869, quoted at p. 625
supra. See also cases cited in note 35 supra.
41. See cases cited in note 35 supra.
42. 1 IITMBR 316-18; cf. decision of the Staatsgerichtshof ffir das Deutsche Reich,
June 29, 1925, 112 R.G.Z. app. 21, 25.
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freedom of competition in the real sense, namely among competitors.
The legislator of 1869 did not foresee the possible dangers for freedom
of trade arising from cartels and other private combinations because
they did not yet exist at that time.4
The idea that individuals also are to be protected against inter-
ference by other individuals or combinations of individuals, in other
words that freedom of trade and other basic rights apply to individuals
in their relationships among each other, has been raised only in
modern times. Even today this question is still very controversial,
particularly with regard to constitutional rights.4 The modern inter-
pretation of freedom of trade has been considered by some as an attack
upon the freedom of every individual to decide for himself whether he
wants to be subjected to contractual restrictions. This has been also
the view of the Reichsgericht. Freedom of contract and association
have been regarded as including individual freedom to enter voluntarily
into restrictions on the conduct of business-within the limits indicated
by the court in the Woodpulp case.
The Balance of Conflicting Freedoms
Thus, the Woodpulp case gave the old principles of freedom of
contract and association priority over the younger principles of
freedom of trade and competition. The opinion shows clearly that
this result is only partially due to the court's economic approach to
the cartel problem. The result largely reflects a lack of balance
between two legal principles-freedom of trade and competition on
the one hand, and freedom of contract and association on the other.
What the court actually omitted was to re-establish this balance, which
had suddenly become endangered by cartels that abused freedom of
contract to restrict the other freedom. The court was badly advised
by economists and could only rely on section 1 of the Trade Regulation
Act of 1869; but when that statute was enacted, the legislature could
not, or in any event, did not, foresee the future development of cartels.
Finally, the court was obviously not prepared to recognize fully the
great importance of its decision.
We are dealing here with a basic question arising in any society.
The two principles are always in fundamental and continuous conflict
with each other for the ideological mastery of a "free" or. "open"
industrial society. Modem society cannot be economically cohesive and
organized unless it permits people to bind themselves to do things for
43. See p. 625 supra.
44. 1 HUBMR 316.
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defined periods of time, and to enter into some kind of more or less
permanent group organization for the pooling of their joint resources
and efforts. This involves giving proper scope to the principle of free
contract and free association. At the same time, modern society cannot
be economically open and dynamic unless it preserves opportunities
for newcomers to enter trade and industry and for independent thought
and initiative by those already engaged therein. This is the principle
of freedom of competition. Of the reconciliation of these principles
Timberg has said:
"When the modern state gives substantial support to either
of these two principles, it must be continually on the alert to see
that the other is not backed off the map. In practice, this has
never happened. Even as allegedly cartelized a country as
Germany has not given its businessmen legal carte blanche to
agree to fix unreasonable or exorbitant prices, to exclude new
blood, or to adhere to unproductive practices. And as purportedly
competitive a society as that of the United States has prohibited
the fundamentally unobjectionable competitive practice of price-
cutting when it is pushed to the limits of extinguishing competi-
tion, and has permitted farmers and export groups, within certain
limits, to combine in self-protection. However, the truce bound-
aries that are drawn between the two warring freedoms are
temporary, shifting and vague. The rules applicable to this
important part of 'industrial geography' have not yet been agreed
on." 4
In comparing the situations in the United States and Germany at
the time of the Woodpulp case, it should be borne in mind that the
Supreme Court was in a better position to fight cartels than was the
Reichsgericht. It met in the Sherman Act a statute which had clearly
introduced the principle of prohibition with reference to all restraints
of trade. Thus, freedom of contract was already restricted in favor of
freedom of trade, so that the starting-points were opposite for the two
courts.
For the Supreme Court the question was how to interpret more
restrictively the broad terms of the Sherman Act. To meet this
difficulty, the Court first worked with the common-law doctrine of
ancillary restraints.4 1 In 1911, this doctrine was replaced by the rule of
45. Timberg, supra note 26, at 445-46. For a fundamental discussion and analysis
of the meaning of freedom and the conditions under which freedom is meaningful, see
Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, in CONFERENCE ON JURISPRUDENCE 33-52
(University of Chicago Law School Conference Series No. 15, 1955).
46. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898); see United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
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reason in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,7 involving the big
Rockefeller oil trust. The rule of reason, however, has not also been
applied to cartels. Since 1927 price fixing-whether horizontal or
vertical-has been held illegal per se.4
For the Reichsgericht, on the contrary, the question was how and
for what reasons to interpret freedom of contract restrictively for the
benefit of individuals who, under the Trade Regulation Act, were
not protected in their freedom of trade among each other but only
against interference by government. For the Supreme Court of the
United States, the latter problem did not exist. Freedom of trade
under the Sherman Act meant the very opposite: protection against
private interference and restriction of freedom of contract. Thus, it
repeatedly occurred that the question was raised whether the act was
constitutional in permitting government interference with business.
49
Considering these facts, the opposite results at which the two
high courts arrived seem more comprehensible. It also appears that
these facts justify the attitude taken by the Reichsgericht in 1897 to
a greater extent than admitted by some of its critics,"' who look upon
the situation of 1897 too much in the light of the later development
of German cartels. Nevertheless, a considerable remainder of dis-
satisfaction cannot be denied, strengthened by the later attitude of
German courts toward cartels.
Aftermath of the Woodpulp Case
As already indicated, the German courts did not grant unlimited
freedom to cartels. A cartel may become illegal if the underlying
agreements and arrangements intend to create or actually result in
a monopoly and the exploitation of consumers.P' What the courts
wanted was to compensate for the shortcomings of unbridled com-
petition. Instead of considering every combination as per se a con-
spiracy against freedom of trade, they inquired into the purpose and
effect of each cartel on the parties involved.
However, it was difficult for the courts to find a yardstick by
which the "reasonableness" of a cartel could be measured. There
47. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927);
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
49. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 565-66 (1898); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
50. Cf. authorities cited in note 32 supra.
51. 38 R.G.Z. at 158. The wording is quoted at p. 627 .rtpra.
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was no common law and no statute expressly governing the legality of
combinations in restraint of trade, and the Trade Regulation Act had
been held inapplicable to cartels. Thus, the courts made an interesting
shift and examined the lawfulness of the cartel activities in question
under the standard of "good morals" (boni mores, good ethics).
This standard is laid down in sections 138 and 826 of the German
Civil Code of January 1, 1900, and in section 1 of the Law Against
Unfair Competition of 1909. Section 138 reads: "A jural act
(Rechtsgeschiift) which is repugnant to good morals (gute Sitten)
is void." 2 Section 826 provides: "Whoever in a manner repugnant
to good morals intentionally inflicts an injury upon another is bound
to such other for compensation of the injury." " Section 1 of the Law
against Unfair Competition 54 was enacted to supplement section 826
of the Civil Code. It reads: "Whoever in business affairs, for the
purpose of competition, commits acts which are repugnant to good
morals may be subject to an action to desist therefrom and to pay
damages."
These broad formulations may astonish a common-law lawyer.
The civil law is often conceived as being completely codified. It is
believed that whatever issue may be brought before the courts, a rule
precisely applicable to the solution of the case can be found in the
statute books. Under this view, lawyers and courts have then merely
to apply such rule to the facts in a more or less mechanical way. This
is not the case. 5
A civil-law system cannot work satisfactorily without introducing
so-called "general clauses" (Generalklauseln). Law is dynamic and
not static. Social, economic and political conditions change con-
stantly. New problems arise which the legislature did not foresee
and therefore could not regulate even in a codification as comprehensive
as the German Civil Code. There will always be considerable "gaps"
in a codified law.
On the other hand, there are certain basic principles governing
application of a law which may be formulated in advance as guideposts
for the decision of unforeseen cases not covered by special provisions.
52. 1 STAUDINraR, op. cit. mupra note 11, § 138.
53. 2 id. § 826.
54. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb of June 9, 1909, [1909] R.G.B. 499
(Germany). For a comprehensive representation of the scope and meaning of § 1, see
BAUMBACH & HfzRsRMHL, WTTBEWEZRBS UND WARENZICHrNR1:CHT (the Law of
Competition and Trademarks), KuRzKoMmZNTAR 161-270 (7th ed. 1956). With respect
to the relationship and border between competition and unfair competition, see id. at
1-63.
55. See Deak, The Place of the Case in the Common and the Civil Law, 8 TUL. L.
RFv. 337, 347-54 (1934), who gives an illustration by an analysis of the French law
against monopolies.
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In brief, this is the essence and the purpose of such general clauses as
we are dealing with here. They are to enable the courts to adjust all of
their decisions along the basic principles governing a code or statute.
The quoted provisions as well as section 1 of the Trade Regulation
Act " are outstanding examples of such general clauses. For the
lack of any antitrust law, the courts had to go back to these provisions.
Almost the whole law of trade regulation had to be developed under
these general provisions which were not particularly intended to apply
to antitrust cases and which actually have been primarily applied to
many other types of cases.
This lengthy explanation is offered not only because we must
herein deal with several of such general clauses, but also because it
would seem to contain the greatest similarities and points of contact
between the two legal systems, for law based upon general clauses
necessarily is case law. General clauses delegate, to a certain extent,
law making power to the courts. However, it will be shown that these
three clauses could by no means fully compensate for the lack of
special antitrust legislation, for they apply only to acts repugnant to
good morals. Hence they do not cover usual cartel activities which
may result in restraint of trade.
Under the decisions of the Reichsgericht, an act violates good
morals "whenever it offends against the feelings of equitable and just
thinking men on fairness." 17 That may be the case depending either
upon the methods applied by a cartel to enforce its measures 58 or upon
the purpose pursued by the cartel' 9 Generally, courts were reluctant
to interfere with cartel activities on the ground that they were repug-
nant to good morals. Said the highest court of Bavaria:
"Although there may be, from the point of view of national
economy, a difference of opinion as to the desirability of such
[cartel] agreements, and even granting that their economic effect
may be considered detrimental, this does in no way mean that
they are against good morals, which is the only point at issue in
this case." 60
56. See p. 625 .ntpra.
57. W. v. Seine Majestit den K6nig von Preussen, Reichsgericht (VII. Zivil-
senat), Oct. 15, 1912, 80 R.G.Z. 219, 221; cf. 1 STAtDINGXR, KoMSNTAR Zum BiiR-
GERLICH-N GzsSTZBUCH § 138, at 695-722 (10th ed. 1936). As to cartels and monop-
olies, see in particular the many cases cited in id. at 707-13.
58. Cf., e.g., decisions of the Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), Feb. 2, 1905, 60
R.G.Z. 94, 104; (VI. Zivilsenat), Dec. 14, 1902, 56 R.G.Z. 271, 274; (VI. Zivilsenat),
May 29, 1902, 51 R.G.Z. 369, 381-85.
59. Cf. decisions of the Reichsgericht (VII. Zivilsenat), Dec. 18, 1931, 134 R.G.Z.
342; (I. Zivilsenat), Sept. 21, 1927, 118 R.G.Z. 84, 89; (VI. Zivilsenat), Oct. 4, 1906,
64 R-G.Z. 155, 158; cases cited in note 58 supra.
60. Decision of the Bayrisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Dec. 27, 1888, 12 B.L.G.
222, 223 (at that time, a rule similar to § 138 of the Civil Code of 1900 already gov-
erned the law).
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The appellate court of Hamburg took the same view even as late as
1925:
"For business men to obtain a monopoly is not, under general
principles of civil law, unlawful even if such monopoly should in
effect be at variance with the interests of national economy." 61
The public, too, felt in a similar way. To a greater or lesser
degree, it believed in the theory of "good" cartels-at least, prior to
World War I. The idea of cooperation superseded the concept of
free competition, often regarded as a kind of economic anarchy leading
easily to ruin."
Courts and the public declined to recognize a necessary inter-
dependence between "good morals" and what one or another economic
theory regarded as "the public interest in the economy." Instead,
courts made the decisive factor whether or not the very existence of
the competitor was threatened in the individual case. A cartel was
held repugnant to good morals if the restraint was general and absolute
(e.g., neither limited in time"6 nor space) or if a plan adopted by
the cartel threatened another's business to the extent of weakening
or undermining it and of substantially injuring his credit or his
standing in the business world (e.g., by boycott or intimidation) .64
This attitude can be understood only if the prevailing German
views on the judicial functions are considered. It is well known that
there is no German common law. The law generally is based upon
codes and statutes. The courts, in applying it, have, of course,
developed many well approved methods and rules for interpreting
general clauses and have generally adapted carefully and reasonably to
current economic and social conditions. But the judges do not consider
themselves as a judicial law-making power. To create the law is
regarded as the exclusive right of the legislative bodies according to
the principle of separation of powers guaranteed under the constitution.
61. Decision of the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht, Jan. 14, 1925, 23 Kartell-
rundschau 256, aff'd by the Reichsgericht (IV. Zivilsenat), Dec. 12, 1925, 24 Kartell-
rundschau 18. See also decision of the Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), Dec. 14, 1902,
56 R.G.Z. 271, 274.
62. This view found expression in the writings of many economists of that time,
who were overwhelmingly in favor of cartels. See the literature cited in note 32 supra
and in the Woodpulp case, Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), Feb. 4, 1897, 38 R.G.Z.
155.
63. Cf. Woodpulp case, supra note 62.
64. Decision of the Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), Dec. 14, 1902, 56 R.G.Z. 271,
278. See also decisions of the Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), April 6, 1922, 104 R.G.Z.
327, 331; (VI. Zivilsenat), June 18, 1914, 85 R.G.Z. 177; (VI. Zivilsenat), Feb. 2,
1905, 60 R.G.Z. 94; (VI. Zivilsenat), Feb. 4, 1897, 38 R.G.Z. 155, 159. As to the abuse
of monopoly power, see decisions of the Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat), March 21,
1923, 106 R.G.Z. 386; (I. Zivilsenat), Oct. 26, 1921, 103 R.G.Z. 82; (I. Zivilsenat),
Oct. 1, 1921, 102 R.G.Z. 396; (VI. Zivilsenat), April 13, 1912, 79 R.G.Z. 224.
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Even in developing law, judges do not feel as free as American and
English judges, although the latter also feel to a certain extent limited
by precedents and-more recently-by an increasing number of
statutesY.
Thus, significant changes of law in Germany generally first
require legislative steps. Since there was no statute against cartels
and monopolies, the courts were reluctant to interfere with what they
regarded as the duty of the legislature to regulate a highly important
question of national ecofiomic policy.
On the whole, the limitations put on freedom of cartels were few
and inappropriate to prevent the further cartelization and concentra-
tion of German industry. With few exceptions, cartel agreements
have been enforced."6 This was, however, much more due to the
lack of any antitrust legislation 67 than to the attitude of the courts.
1923 to 1933: The Concept of Cartel and "Trust" Control
During and after World War I, cartels and a number of single
enterprises continued to gain power and thereby to restrict free competi-
tion. In 1911 there were about 600 cartels. In 1925 there existed
3,000.8 When, in the spring of 1920, prices dropped, cartels sought to
soften the decline. Subsequently demand progressively exceeded supply
and prices continuously increased. Cartels did or perhaps could not pre-
vent this development, which culminated in the terrible inflation. Cartels
and "trusts" shifted the risks of the state of business and currency on
customers and the general public. In face of these powerful combina-
tions there was little "economic freedom" ' for smaller businessmen and
65. For a comparative analysis of the judicial process in the United States and
Germany by considering the type of judicial thinking in each system and each system's
attitude toward judicial law making, see Von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the
United States and Germany-A Comparative Analysis, in FESTSCHRIFT FUiR ERNST
RABEL 67 (Doelle, Rheinstein & Zweigert eds. 1954) and the literature cited therein.
66. See, e.g., decisions of the Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), Nov. 7, 1912, [1913]
Warneyers Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts 103; (I. Zivilsenat), Nov. 6, 1902, 53
R.G.Z. 19; (II. Zivilsenat), Feb. 19, 1901, 48 R.G.Z. 305 (the Rhenanian-Westphalian
Coal Syndicate case, discussed at note 10 supra).
67. The Imperial Administration opposed such legislation for different reasons,
one of which was the view that German industry, unless cartelized, would be too weak
in the competitive struggle with cartelized foreign industries. See 9 KART=LLRUND-
SCHAU 15 (Germany 1911). For a survey of the attempts made by several Reichstag
(lower house of the former Reich) parties to introduce anti-cartel legislation, see
MICHELS, CARTELS, COMBINES AND TRUSTS IN POST-WAR GERMANY 34 (1928). See
also REICHSAMT DES INNEREN, DENKSCHRIFT UBER DAS KARTELLWESEN (4 vols. 1906-
1908).
68. 1 HUERa 282. For a comparative description of the development of cartels and
trusts in the United States and Germany until 1938, see HAUSSMANN, KONZERNE UND
KARTELLE im ZEIC rE nE "WRTSCHAFTSLENXUNG" 27-143 (1938).
69. As safeguarded by the VERFASSUNG DES DXUTSCHEXN R.XIcHES (Constitution
of the German Reich) art. 151 (919) (hereinafter cited as WEIMAR CONST.).
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consumers. It is true, freedom of trade and industry was guaranteed by
the Weimar Constitution of 1919 within the limits drawn by the
federal law."" This freedom, however, did not include freedom of
competition, for reasons already explained. 1 On the other hand,
freedom of contract and association had been still strengthened by the
constitution.72
The Ordinance of 1923
This development lead to increasing public criticism of cartels.
Demands for government interference became very strong.73 The
government finally responded and enacted in 1923 the "Ordinance
Against Abuse of Economic Power." 7'
Under section 1 of the Ordinance, all:
"Agreements and understandings which contain obligations re-
garding the manipulation of production or of sales, regarding the
conditions to be observed in business transactions, regarding the
method of fixing prices or regarding the demand prices (syndi-
cates, cartels, conventions, and similar agreements), have to be
executed in writing."
The following regulations were contained in sections 1-9: 75 All
agreements and understandings falling under section 1 (in other words
all types of cartels) :
(i) must be in writing;
(ii) are void when confirmed by word of honor or when solemnly
ratified in any other way;
70. Ibid.
71. See p. 629 supra.
72. WgmAR CoNsT. arts. 152, 159.
73. For this development, see CALLMANN, DAs DIJTSCHt K~aRMLLaCHT 61-62
(1934) ; MicHSmLs, op. cit. supra note 67; Kronstein, supra note 30, at 658-71 (devel-
opment prior to Hitler) ; Wolff, supra note 26, at 345-46.
74. Verordnung gegen Missbrauch Wirtschaftlicher Machtstellungen of Nov. 2,
1923, [1923] R.G.B. pt. I, at 1067 (Germany) (hereinafter cited as Ordinance of
1923). The ordinance is based on legislative powers delegated to the administration by
the Law of Oct. 13, 1923, [1923] R.G.B. pt. I, at 943 (Germany). For an English
translation of most of the sections of the ordinance, see NEWMAN 265-69. This law was
enacted to enable the administration to meet effectively an extraordinary emergency
when the currency inflation threatened with collapse the economic and financial system
of Germany. The ordinance, therefore, is a rule of law enacted by emergency execu-
tive power. See WsimAR CoNsT. art. 48(2). The ordinance has been amended by the
Emergency Ordinances of July 26, 1930, [1930] R.G.B. pt. I, at 311, 328 (Germany)
and of June 14, 1932, [1932] R.G.B. pt. I, at 285, 289 (Germany); and by Law of
July 15, 1933, [1933] R.G.B. pt. I, at 487 (Germany).
75. For a detailed discussion of the ordinance, see CALLMANx, DAS D .UTSCHn
KARTLLRcHT 295-670 (1934) ; ISAY & TsCHI.RscHrKY, KARTVLLMORDNTUNG (2d ed.
1930); Mscngrs, op. cit. supra note 67 at 43-59; Grossmann, Cartel and Syndicate
Legislation in Germany, A.B.A. ComP. L. BuRIAu BULL. 210-15 (1933); Kessler,
German Cartel Regulation Under the Decree of 1923, 50 Q.J. EcoN. 680 (1936) ; Kron-
stein & Leighton, supra note 26.
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(iii) are void when they exclude or hinder an appeal to the cartel
court or when they destroy the effectiveness of the cartel law
or when they attempt to evade it;
(iv) when endangering the common welfare or business as a
whole, they may be:
(a) voided by the cartel court upon application by the
Minister of Economics or restricted in the ways of
their execution by the court;
(b) cancelled by any one of the contracting parties without
prior notice upon a decree authorizing such action,
which the Minister of Economics may issue;
(c) investigated by the Minister of Economics in which
case the agreements and understandings can come into
force only after the Minister has received a copy of
them;
(v) can be cancelled by any one of the contracting parties with-
out prior notice for reason of weight;
(vi) cannot be secured by a bond without the approval of the
presiding judge of the cartel court. The same approval is
needed where the cartel desires to take drastic steps against
one or several enterprises to force them to yield. The ap-
plication of the sharpest means of pressure against cartel
members, outsiders or third parties is made dependent upon
the approval of the presiding judge of the cartel court.
All these regulations were based upon section 1. The other
section outlining the scope of the Ordinance is section 10. It provides:
"Whenever the terms of delivery (standardized contracts) or the
methods of price fixing adopted by enterprises or combinations of
enterprises (trusts, communities of interest, syndicates, cartels,
conventions, and similar combinations) are apt to endanger
economy as a whole or the common welfare (section 4, paragraph
2) through misuse of a powerful economic position, the Cartel
Court, upon application of the Minister of Economics, may au-
thorize any party to withdraw from any contract giving rise to
such domination."
Section 10, as interpreted by the courts, deals only with monopoly and
includes, besides monopolistic cartels, other monopolistic organizations
of whatever structure, such as trusts or combines (affiliated enterprises
under a centralized administration, in Germany called Konzerne) and
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single giant enterprises. In contrast, a powerful economic position is
not required for cartels and similar combinations falling under section 1.
The ordinance is concerned with three kinds of legal relationships.
First, it regulates the internal relations between the members of a
cartel. Secondly, it contains provisions concerning the external rela-
tions of powerful economic combinations of any kind with third parties
and-thirdly-with the public. The ordinance did not apply to com-
pulsory cartels which would be established by law or government
decree.7 "a Thereunder fell, e.g., the Potash Cartel, the Rhenanian-
Westphalian Coal Cartel and the Match Cartel.
The significance of the Ordinance of 1923 lies in the fact that
the hitherto prevailing principle of judicially-limited freedom of cartels
was replaced by the entirely new principle of cartel control by ad-
ministrative agencies. Previously, the courts had had no opportunity
for passing upon cartel agreements unless the members of the cartel
did not perform their contractual obligations. Now, administrative
agencies were authorized to interfere with restrictive business practices
on their own initiative in the interest of the economy as a whole and
the common welfare. The ordinance, however, did not condemn cartels
and other combinations per se; rather it was based upon the "harmful
effects" approach in preventing only the abuse of economic power.
Therefore, it implicitly confirmed for the first time the right to establish
cartels and other combinations, subject to certain limitations discussed
above.76 "Good" cartels remained lawful as before.
The already enumerated control powers (nullification, prohibition
of performance of cartel contracts, authorization for termination and
membership withdrawal, investigation, approval to certain acts of
cartels, e.g., boycotts, and dissolution of certain combinations) were
exercised partly by the Reich Minister of Economics and partly by the
so-called Cartel Court.7 7 The latter was not actually a court in the
proper sense of the term. It was rather an independent administrative
agency which merely was organized like a court and which formally
used a court-like procedure. Most of its functions were not of judicial
but administrative nature.
78
The decisions of the Cartel Court were rendered by the presiding
judge and four associate judges. Two of the associate judges were
75a. Ordinance of 1923, § 19.
76. Decision of the Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), Dec. 14, 1928, 122 R.G.Z. 260,
263.
77. Ordinance of 1923, § 11. The Cartel Court was later replaced by the Reichs-
wirtschaftsgericht (Reich Industrial Court).
78. Huber, Das Wesen des Kartellgerichts, 1930 KARTELLRUNDSCHAU 636 (Ger-
many).
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appointed by the Reichsprsident (Reich President) and were required
to have the qualifications of a judge in the regular courts. The other
two had to be experts and were to be selected with proper regard to
opposing economic interests and common welfare.7 9 The main reason
for establishing the court apparently was that it could act quicker
and more competently than the ordinary courts. The latter probably
would have been less able to reach decisions for the best protection of
the public interest because of their more conservative attitude and
their lack of economic qualification to understand and evaluate the
complexity of modern business life.
The other agency, the Reich Minister of Economics, was author-
ized only to take action by instituting proceedings before the Cartel
Court, which then decided the case. But the Minister's powers to
interfere directly with cartels were broadened considerably by the
Emergency Ordinance To Meet Financial, Economic and Social Emer-
gencies of July 26, 1930.8
The theory underlying the division of jurisdiction was that the
Cartel Court decided cases where the position of an individual member
of a cartel or of an individual outsider was controversial, whereas the
Minister of Economics decided cases where the position and actions
of the cartel as a whole were at stake.
Although the ordinance considerably reduced the scope of the
courts' jurisdiction in favor of the powerful administrative control,
from which there was no appeal, the civil courts remained free to
continue their previous judicial control of cartels and other combina-
tions insofar as the administrative agencies did not intervene under
the ordinance. Thus civil courts adjudicated private suits between
combinations and their members or outsiders. Apart from applying
the ordinances, the courts continued to apply the "good morals"
yardstick ' under sections 138 and 826 of the Civil Code and section
1 of the Law Against Unfair Competition.
The Failure of Cartel Control
To review the numerous cases which were decided under the
new law both by the administrative agencies and the courts would be
beyond the scope of this article.8 2 Nor can we attempt here a detailed
79. Ordinance of 1923, § 11. As to the proceedings of the court, see id. §§ 12-15,
20-22.
80. Law of July 26, 1930, [1930] R.G.B. pt. I, at 311, 328 (Germany) ; cf. note 74
supra. See also the other amendments cited in note 74 supra.
81. See pp. 632-34 supra.
82. See Kessler, supra note 75; Kronstein & Leighton, Cartel Control: 4 Record
of Failure, 55 YALE L.J. 297, 305-25 (1946); Wolff, Business Monopolies: Three Eu-
ropean Systems in Their Bearing on American Law [French, English and German], 9
Tr. L. Rxv. 325, 345-70 (1935).
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evaluation of the effectiveness of the thus-exercised control over
cartels ' and monopolies, which would necessarily include an inquiry
into the economic situation prevailing during the twenties in Germany,
particularly the serious crisis which occurred around 1930.
It is dear, however, that agencies and courts faced at the least
a very difficult problem in interpreting such general terms as "public
economy," "common welfare" and "abuse of an economic powerful
position", although the Ordinance of 1923 sought to give some defini-
tions ' and to describe the restrictive business practices to be fought
(e.g., sections 1, 9 and 10). Today, it is the opinion of the administra-
tion and many economists and lawyers that the agencies and courts
generally failed to fulfill the declared legislative intent, namely to re-
establish "freedom of the market" and to resist "artificial restriction of
production." '
This failure, however, seems not so much due to the attitude
taken by agencies and courts vis-a-vis cartels. Rather, the reason for
the failure would seem to be a lack of workability and practicability of
cartel control, however elaborate the respective statute may be. "Good"
and "bad" cartels, "reasonableness" and "public interest" cannot be
really defined by statute. The consequence is a lack of Rechtssicher-
heit, the principle that people should know in advance as far as possible
whether their planned actions are lawful. Under a system of ad-
ministrative supervision, that is very difficult to accomplish.
Also, the agency charged with administering such a law is very
heavily burdened. A case by case examination of the fairness of the
varying business practices of hundreds or thousands of cartels requires
so much time, staff, expert knowledge and investigatory powers as
can scarcely-if ever-be provided for the agency. Actually, the
ordinance, to a considerable extent, transferred law-making power to
the executive branch of the government. However, it would seem
less dangerous to thrust such law-making power upon the judicial
83. See BoHM, W4TnXVMaB UND MONOPOLXAMPV (Competition and Monopoly
Struggle) (1933) and authorities cited in note 82 supra.
84. Ordinance of 1923, § 4(2) is of particular importance and interest: "The pub-
lic economy or general welfare shall be in particular considered to be endangered when-
ever production or marketing are restricted in an economically unjustified manner,
whenever prices are increased or maintained at a high level, whenever premiums against
devaluation risks are added to a price calculated on a stable currency basis, or when-
ever economic freedom is unreasonably impaired by refusals to buy or sell or by fixing
varying prices or conditions of sale."
85. Official press release of Nov. 2, 1923, accompanying the ordinance. It is fully
reprinted in CALLMANx, DAs DEUTScHE KARTtLiRztCHr 673-74 (1934). As to the dif-
ferent positions taken by German economists and lawyers, see survey by Fikentscher,
Die deutsche Kartellrechtswissenschaft 1945-1954, Eine Kritische Ubersicht, 5 W.W.
205, 206-12 (Germany 1955). With respect to American scholars, see, e.g., Kessler,
supra note 75; Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 82; Wolff, supra note 82, at 345-70.
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branch or, at least, to give the judiciary control over the lawfulness
of the agency decisions by means of appeal.8 6
A final disadvantage of mere cartel- control is the danger that
government interference with business may increase to an extent in-
compatible with private initiative, progress and individual freedom
to act. Contrariwise, if government interference remains weak and
does not really control all misuses of economic power, business will
continue to combine and to restrict free competition. It would seem
that this was the situation prevailing in Germany under the principle
of cartel and trust control as introduced by the Ordinance of 1923.
The new draft law appears to avoid many of these difficulties by
declaring cartel agreements null and void per se. Thereby it creates a
clear legal situation, one comprehensible for everybody. And it
prevents, at least in this important area, a good deal of government
interference. By declaring cartel agreements null and void, the draft
law makes the cartel simply powerless to enforce the agreement against
outbreaking individual members. Cartel experience proves that in
most cases some members of a cartel eventually dissent on its policy,
break the discipline agreed upon (e.g., by price cutting) and thus make
the cartel ineffective or even cause its disintegration.
1933 to 1945: The Concept of State-Directed Cartels in a Planned
Economy
Under the totalitarian system, after 1933, the government no
longer restricted itself to an administrative control of cartels and other
combinations, although the Cartel Ordinance of 1923, as amended,
was further applied. Rather, the principle of control against abuse of
economic power was superseded by a system of positive government
direction of cartels. No longer independent, they became a vehicle
of an administration-planned economy.
Cartels proved themselves a very appropriate device to increase
the power of the totalitarian system. By law 87 the Reich Minister of
Economics was authorized to establish compulsory cartels in any
branch of industry or, by executive decree, to compel outsiders to
join cartels already existing. s Compulsory and free cartels were
used to establish and maintain price, raw material and production
86. But cf. pp. 634-35 supra.
87. Law on Establishment of Compulsory Cartels (Gesetz uber Errichtung von
Zwangskartellen) of July 15, 1933, [1933] R.G.B. pt. 1, at 488 (Germany). For an
English translation of the law, see NEWMAN 269-71.
88. Cf. Wolff, supra note 82, at 370-77. The administration of the Weimar Repub-
lic, too, was already authorized to institute compulsory cartels. See text at note 75a
supra. However, by the Law on Establishment of Compulsory Cartels of July 15, 1933,
[1933] R.G.B. pt. 1, at 488 (Germany), this power was considerably extended.
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controls as introduced by the government. Finally, they were used
to strengthen the government-planned war industry. 9
At the beginning of World War II, German industry was highly
cartelized and concentrated, and completely in the hands of the Nazi
administration.
THE PRESENT ANTITRUST LAW IN GERMANY: PROHIBITION AND
ELIMINATION OF EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF
ECONOMIC POWER
The Legal Basis of Allied Antitrust Policy and Law
When Allied forces entered Western Germany, supreme legisla-
tive, executive and judicial authority in the occupied area was vested
in the Allied Supreme Commander. Military government was in-
troduced to exercise these powers.' By the Four Power Statement
of June 5, 1945, the Control Council was established in Berlin as the
supreme authority for Germany.91 The basic charter for the quad-
ripartite government is the Report on the Tripartite Conference of
Berlin, containing the so-called Potsdam Agreements of August 2,
1945, signed by Stalin, Truman and Attlee.92 The Control Council
notified the German people by its Proclamation No. 1 of August 30,
1945 that supreme authority "in matters affecting Germany as a whole"
was conferred upon the Council. 3
Section III of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin
of August 2, 1945 contains the agreement on "The Political and
Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the
Initial Control Period," paragraph 12 of which reads:
"At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall
be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present exces-
sive concentrations of economic powers as exemplified in particu-
lar by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrange-
ments." 14
89. See 1 HUBER 329; Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 82, at 328-32. For the
political background, see LOCHNER, TYCOONS AND TYRANT (1955).
90. Proclamation No. 1, art. II, MIL. Gov. GAz. issue A, at 2 (U.S. Zone Germany
June 1, 1946).
91. CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY, OFICIAL GAZETTE [hereinafter OG/CC]
Supp. No. 1, at 10 (April 30, 1946).
92. Id. at 13, 14-17.
93. OG/CC No. 1, at 4 (Oct. 29, 1945) ; see Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative
Process in Occupied Germany, 57 YALE L.J. 724, 725, 994-96 (1948).
94. OG/CC Supp. No. 1, at 15 (April 30, 1946). Subsection B of the agreement,
"Economic Principles," also contains numerous further provisions relating to German
economy. Id. at 16. Section IV of the Report contains the "Agreement on Repara-
tions." Ibid.
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The Military Government Decartelization and Deconcentration Laws
The Laws Nos. 56/78/96
The four powers, however, failed to agree on a common decentral-
ization program under paragraph 12 of the Potsdam Agreement. In
1947, therefore, the three western powers acted separately and enacted
military government decartelization laws in their respective zones of
occupation.' The American and British Zone Laws Nos. 56/78
were enacted in order:
(i) to prevent Germany from endangering the safety
of her neighbors and again constituting a threat to international
peace, (ii) to destroy Germany's economic potential to wage
war, (iii) to insure that measures taken for Germany's recon-
struction are consistent with peaceful and democratic purposes,
(iv) to lay the groundwork for building a healthy and democratic
German economy." "
These laws have been said to be "the most incisive intervention
in the internal affairs of the defeated people that military government
has undertaken to date." 17 Although based to a large extent upon
American antitrust law,9" they go much further in effect. They
not only prohibit all future restrictive and monopolistic practices
including German participation in international cartels,99 but also
95. For the United States Zone and Land Bremen: Mil. Gov. Law No. 56, Pro-
hibition of Excessive Concentration of German Economic Power, Jan. 28, 1947, Mm.
Gov. GAz. issue C, at 2 (U.S. Zone Germany April 1, 1947) (effective Feb. 12, 1947)
(hereinafter cited as Mil. Gov. Law No. 56), reprinted in 16 DEP'T STATE BULL. 443
(1947); NEwmAN 278-85.
For the United Kingdom Zone: Mil. Gov. Ordinance No. 78, Feb. 12, 1947, Mn..
Gov. GAZ. No. 16, at 412 (British Zone Germany 1947). The wording of the ordi-
nance is similar to Law No. 56.
For the French Zone: Mil. Gov. Ordinance No. 96, June 9, 1947, 2 JoURNAL. Ovri-
CIEL DU COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF FRANcAIS EN ALLEMAGNE 784 (French Zone
Germany 1947). The French ordinance does not contain a regulation as detailed as
the two other laws. It merely prohibits excessive concentrations of German economic
power by a general clause and provides an examination of cartels in accordance
with principles applicable under French law, which is based on the principle of cartel
control. However since 1950 the Ordinance No. 96 has been interpreted as prohibiting
cartels unless expressly permitted by the Military Government. See also 1 HUBER
337-38. For an English translation of the ordinance, see NEWMAN 285-88.
96. 16 DEP'T STATx BULL. 443 (1947).
97. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1000. For a brief critical review of Allied anti-
trust policy in Germany, see Bock & Korsch, Decartelization and Deconcentration in
the West German Economy Since 1945, in ANTi-TRUST LAWs, A COMPARATIVE SYM-
Posium 138 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium vol. 3, Friedmann
ed. 1956). Under the same title, Sidney H. Willner, former Chief, Decartelization and
Deconcentration Division, United States High Commission for Germany, states a dif-
ferent position. Id. at 176-88.
98. See Frank, American Policy Concerning German Monwpolies, 16 Ds,'r STAT
BULL. 913 (1947); Just, The Influence of the Anti-Trust Laws on the New German
Decartelization Law, 9 FtD. B.J. 33 (1947).
99. Mil. Gov. Law No. 56, art. II, § 5.
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provide for the complete decartelization and deconcentration of
German industry. Therefore they "repeal, alter, amend or supersede
all provisions of German law inconsistent therewith," ' in particular the
Cartel Ordinance of 1923, as amended."01
Article I, section 1 of the Laws Nos. 56/78 prohibits "excessive
concentrations of German economic power" and declares that their
activities are "illegal and . . . shall be eliminated," except in cases
where the implementing agency grants exemptions.'
The laws declare to be excessive concentrations of economic power:
"[C]artels, combines, syndicates, trusts, associations or any
other form of inderstanding or concerted undertaking between
persons, which have the purpose or effect of restraining, or of
fostering monopolistic control of domestic or international trade
or other economic activity, or of restricting access to domestic or
international markets." 103
In prohibiting cartels and similar combinations in restraint of trade
ipso iure, the laws introduced for the first time in Germany the
principle of cartel prohibition. The laws not only cover horizontal
understandings but also vertical restraints of trade like resale price
maintenance and exclusive arrangements.0 4
With respect to single enterprises-in spite of their wording-the
laws in effect do not provide a general prohibition, but rather a case-by-
case examination by the implementing Allied agency. Unlike cartels, big
single enterprises prove inappropriate to prohibition and elimination
simply by statutory order. The complicated legal and factual relations
which constitute such enterprises required individual deconcentration
proceedings.
The laws therefore provide, in article I, section 3, that all
economic enterprises employing more than 10,000 persons shall be
examined as prima facie constituting excessive concentrations of
economic power. If the agency designated by the military govern-
ment finds that the enterprise in fact constitutes an excessive concen-
tration of economic power, the enterprise is to be dissolved into
independent competitive units.
100. Id. art. VI, § 10.
101. See note 74 supra. With respect to the deconcentration of certain specific in-
dustries, see pp. 646-47 infra.
102. Mil. Gov. Law No. 56, art. III, § 6. See also 1 Hunta 335-86, 436-41; Rasch,
Das Verbot uberinassiger Konsentration deutscher Wirtschaftskraft (Prohibition of
Excessive Concentration of German Economic Power), 1947 SU4DDXUTSCHs JURIS-
TENZErrUNG 151 (Germany).
103. Mil. Gov. Law No. 56, art. I, § 2.
104. Id. art. V, § 9(c).
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To execute this decartelization and deconcentration program, a
powerful Allied agency was established.' It was authorized to take
such action as it found appropriate to accomplish the purpose of the
laws, including the elimination of corporate entities, the redistribution
and removal of property, investments and other assets, and the cancel-
lation of obligations of cartels.' 6
The proceedings were in brief as follows. In order first to have
a general survey, all enterprises affected by the laws had to submit
detailed information to the Allied agency. °7  The agency then had to
scrutinize the reports received and notify each enterprise whether it
was within the scope of the laws or was exempt from their operation.'
With respect to cartels, the agency could then issue an order
to show cause. Subsequently, the alleged combination had to prove
that it did not come within the scope of the laws. Hearings
might be granted, but in earlier years of the occupation they generally
were not permitted. Finally, the agency could either grant an exemp-
tion from the operation of the law or issue a cease and desist order. 0 9
Actually, the Allied agency carried out several such decartelization
proceedings." 0 Also, a good many private actions for injunction and
damages were brought by private persons before the German courts
against injurious acts of cartels, particularly boycotts."'
105. Id. art. IV, § 7. Prior to 1949, the "designated agency" was the Bipartite De-
cartelization Commission (BIDEC). Order No. 2 to Law No. 56, MIL. Gov. GAz.
issue L, at 6 (U.S. Zone Germany Dec. 16, 1948). It was followed by the (tripartite)
Decartelization and Industrial Deconcentration Group (DIDEG) of the (West) Allied
High Commission ir Germany. Mil. Gov. Law No. 56, art. IV, § 8 provided that the
Allied agency "may delegate to appropriate German governmental agencies such pow-
ers, and may issue such directions with respect thereto, as it may deem necessary for
the enforcement and application of this law." But any power to make decisions was
not transferred to the German administration, which had merely some advisory and
preliminary functions in the execution of the decartelization and deconcentration pro-
gram.
106. Id. art. IV, § 7.
107. Regulation No. 1 of Feb. 12, 1947, art. V (under and in amplification of Law
No. 56), Mm. Gov. GAz. issue C, at 4 (U.S. Zone Germany April 1, 1947) (herein-
after cited as Regulation No. 1), reprinted in 16 DP'T STATx BULL. 446 (1947);
NlwMAN 284. Regulation No. 1 has been amended by Amendment No. 1 of April 1,
1947, MiL. Gov. GAz. issue E, at 5 (U.S. Zone Germany July 1, 1947); Amendment
No. 2 of March 1, 1948, Mm.. Gov. GAz. issue J, at 17 (U.S. Zone Germany March 16,
1948) ; Amendment No. 3 of July 27, 1949, MiL. Gov. GAz. issue N, at 28 (U.S. Zone
Germany Sept. 21, 1949). Regulation No. 1, as amended, is reprinted in German trans-
lation in BAUmBACr & HEFERmEHL, op. cit. supra note 54, at 635-46.
108. Regulation No. 1, art. VI(A); Mil. Gov. Law No. 56, arts. III, IV.
109. See provisions cited in note 108 supra.
110. See, e.g., 1 HuthER 382-84; 2 id. at 767.
111. The legal basis for such private actions is the German Civil Code of Jan. 1,
1900, § 823(2), which provides: "Whoever injures a law which has the purpose to
protect another person [in other words here the Laws 56/78/96] is bound to such other
for compensation of the injury arising therefrom." 2 SAUDiNGER, KOMMIXNTAR ZuM
BbRGERLI'cHEN GESErZBUCH § 823 (9th ed. 1929). Sections 138 and 826 of the Civil
Code and § 1 of the Law Against Unfair Competition also apply. See p. 632 supra. Ex-
amples of such private actions are cited in 1 HUBMR 386; 2 id. at 767.
646 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
With regard to single enterprises, the agency could issue de-
tailed orders to deconcentrate. This could be done by dissolu-
tion, selling of assets, division, creation of several new and independent
firms, selling of participations in other firms or selling of parts of the
plants belonging to a trust."' A combination of several of these
devices was applied in the deconcentration proceedings against the
Robert Bosch GmbH trust of Stuttgart, an important manufacturer
of electrical equipment."' Deconcentration of the German motion pic-
ture industry was introduced by Order No. 1, issued pursuant to Law
No. 56, effective on March 8, 1948,"' but later continued under special
laws.
Special Allied Deconcentration Laws
The following industries were deconcentrated under numerous
special laws of the Control Council, the Military Governments, the
(Western) Allied High Commission and the Federal Republic of
Germany:
(i) The coal and steel industry, namely the following trusts:
Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Kl6ckner, Mannesmann, Reichs-
werke, Hoesch, Gutehoffnungshiitte, Otto Wolff, Ilseder
Hfitte, Thyssen-Bornemisza, Flick, Krupp. The big coal
selling syndicate (former Rhenanian-Westphalian Coal
Syndicate) " was also liquidated.
(ii) The chemical industry: I. G. Farben trust.
(iii) The motion picture industry: Cautio, UiFI, UFA trust.
(iv) The three big banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdener Bank,
Commerzbank.
The numerous and difficult deconcentration proceedings and plans
-different for each industry and enterprise--cannot be described
here." 6 For instance, the steel trust Vereinigte Stahlwerke (formerly
the biggest German steel trust) has been dissolved into nineteen in-
dependent enterprises; the chemical trust I. G. Farben into three large
and some smaller enterprises.
112. 1 id. at 438-40.
113. 1 id. at 440.
114. MIL. Gov. GAZ. issue J, at 16 (U.S. Zone Germany March 16, 1948).
115. See note 10 supra.
116. A detailed description will be found in 1 HuBER 441-76; 2 id. at 770-87, 790-
94. With respect to the deconcentration of the German iron and steel industry, see the
comprehensive report. DIE NEUORNUNG DER EISEN UND STAHLINDUSTRIE Im GEtI-
ETE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK, EIN BFRICHT DER STARLTRFUHAENDERVEREINIGUNG (1954).
On the chemical trust, see RxICHL=, DAs ERBE DER I. G. FARBEN (1956).
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Under the Occupation Statute of May 12, 1949, the three western
powers had reserved to themselves the power to deconcentrate German
industries." 7 However, on March 19, 1951 the Council of the Allied
High Commission in Germany decided, in implementing the decisions
taken by the 1950 New York meeting of the three foreign ministers,
to exercise such reserved powers only to ensure completion of Allied
deconcentration proceedings already initiated. "Upon completion of
such programmes and actions these powers will be relinquished." "s
Thus, action to deconcentrate any of the existing enterprises in
other industries was not undertaken. For example, the preliminary
proceedings against the giant Siemens Electrical Company were not
formally instituted before the decision of the aforementioned conference,
and therefore discontinued.
On May 5, 1955, the Occupation regime was terminated in the
Federal Republic of Germany by the Bonn Conventions."" Effective
that date, legislative, executive and judicial authority was returned to
the German government. Allied Laws Nos. 56/78/96 and the laws
concerning the deconcentration of the coal, steel and the chemical in-
dustry became German law. The special laws remain in force only
until the deconcentration of these industries is terminated.' The
Laws Nos. 56/78/96 remain in force until repealed or replaced by the
German legislative bodies.'" The powers of the former Allied agency
117. Occupation Statute of May 12, 1949, para. 2(b), [1949] ALLIED HIGH CoM-
MISSION FOR GFRMANY, OFFICIAL GAZETTE [hereinafter OG/AHC] 13. The First
Instrument of Revision of the Occupation Statute of March 6, 1951, [1951] OG/AHC
792 did not change this power. But see text at note 118 infra.
118. Decision No. 10 of the Council of the AHC: Programme for the Revision of
Occupation Controls para. 1, [1951] OG/AHC 794.
119. Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954 (effective May 5, 1955), amending by schedules I-V
the Bonn Conventions between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany,
May 26, 1952, [1955] B.G.B. pt. II, at 213 (Germany). See also Kutscher, Die Been-
digung des Besatzungsregimes nach dent Pariser Protokoll Join 23. 10. 1954, 9 DnR
Ba n-ma AAEa [hereinafter D.B.] 941 (Germany 1954).
With respect to decartelization and deconcentration, see the regulation in the Con-
vention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation
(one of the Bonn conventions, as amended by the said protocol) pt. I, [1955] B.G.B.
pt. II, at 234 (Germany) (hereinafter cited as Convention on the Settlement of
Matters) and the comments thereto by Gleiss & Fikentscher, Weitergeltung des alliier-
ten Dekartellierungsrechts, 5 W.W. 525 (Germany 1955) and Kutscher, supra at 943-
44.
120. Convention on the Settlement of Matters pt. I, arts. 9-12. See also Kutscher,
supra note 119. With respect to the deconcentration of the three big banks and the
motion picture industry, German laws have replaced Allied laws already in 1952 and
1953: Gesetz ueber den Niederlassungsbereich von Kreditinstituten of March 29, 1952,
[1952] B.G.B. pt. I, at 427 (Germany) and Gesetz zur Abwicklung und Entflechtung
des ehemaligen reichseigenen Filmvermoegens of June 5, 1953, [1953] B.G.B. pt. I, at
276 (Germany).
121. Convention on the Settlement of Matters pt. I.
648 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW .[Vol. 105
under these laws are exercised by the German Federal Minister of
Economics.'
The Present State of German Industrial Concentration
With respect to cartels, it can probably be said that German in-
dustry is to a large extent decartelized today, for cartels are pro-
hibited per se and violations have been repeatedly enjoined or
punished under Laws Nos. 56/78/96.' In numerous other cases,
private actions were brought before German courts against alleged
cartel and other activities in restraint of trade.
2 4
The Federal Minister of Economics continues to enforce the laws.
For instance, on February 14, 1956, he issued a cease and desist order
against three leading firms in the photo industry (Agfa, Perutz and
Schleussner) which had raised the fixed resale prices of their films
simultaneously in the same amount. Although it was not clear whether
this price increase was due to agreement or merely parallel action, the
Minister prohibited the firms from continuing their vertical systems of
resale price maintenance under Laws Nos. 56/78.' Recently, he
issued several other orders to cease and desist or to show cause.'28
122. Decision No. 36 of the Council of the AHC of May 4, 1955, [1955] OG/AHC
3248.
123. For cases, see 1 HUBtR 384-85; Moehring, Die Bedeutung der Ride of Reason
im Kartellrecht (The Meaning of the Rule of Reason in the [Allied and German]
Antitrust Law), 5 W.W. 89 (Germany 1955); Peters, Ein Jahr deutsche Kartellauf-
sicht, 9 DnR Bmaurm 541, 543-44 (Germany 1956) ; decision of Federal Supreme Court
(I. Strafsenat), April 10, 1956, 9 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 599.
124. See, e.g., cases discussed in 1 Humna 386; 2 id. at 767; Lindenmaier, Die
Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes sum Wettbewerb under besonderer Berueck-
sichtigung der Dekartellierungsvorschriften (Cases on Trade Regulation Decided by
the Federal Supreme Court, in Particular Under the Decartelization Law), 3 W.W.
259 (Germany 1953) ; Moehring, supra note 123, at 12-19, 98-101.
125. The cease and desist order is reprinted in 11 D.B. 190 (Germany 1956) and
6 W.W. 226 (Germany 1956). See also Note, 11 D.B. 190 (Germany 1956). Subse-
quently, the three firms agreed to reduce their resale film prices somewhat and the
Minister of Economics repealed his cease and desist order. 6 W.W. 273 (Germany
1956). See also Gleiss, Der Fall Fotofilne, 6 W.W. 354 (Germany 1956).
Whether or not individual resale-price maintenance schemes for branded and copy-
righted articles are lawful under Laws Nos. 56/78/96 is highly controversial. See,
e.g., survey and discussion by Steindorf, Das Verbot der Preisbindung fuer Marken-
artikel ntach geltendem Recht (The Prohibition of Resale Price Maintenance for
Branded Articles Under Present Law), 10 D.B. 1001 (Germany 1955). Some courts
held resale price-maintenance agreements for branded articles lawful. E.g., Decision
of the Kammergericht (state appellate court of Berlin), Nov. 17, 1953, 16 Der Mar-
kenartikel 64. More recently, other courts held vertical price fixing illegal. E.g., Deci-
sion of the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (state appellate court of Stuttgart), Nov. 17,
1955, partly reprinted in 10 D.B. 1070 (Germany 1955) and 11 D.B. 183 (Germany
1956).
126. On March 9, 1956, the Minister of Economics prohibited the application of
rules of competition introduced by the Kaliko-Association for its members and he ob-
jected to certain price lists issued by the association. 6 W.W. 273 (Germany 1956).
On April 4, 1956, he issued an order to show cause against the Milchfoederungsfond
of German farmers and their associations, a milk cartel introduced to increase the
prices of butter. 6 W.W. 352-53 (Germany 1956) ; see Buentig, Kartellrechtliche
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Although there are numerous applications, exemptions from the cartel
prohibition have been granted only in very few extraordinary cases.127
The granted permissions would seem to correspond with the provisions
of the German draft law regarding crisis, rationalization and export
cartels, discussed later herein.'2
As to big individual enterprises, the situation is different. It is
true, leading coal, steel, chemical and motion picture companies as
well as the big banks have been split into a considerable number of
independent enterprises! 9 However, with the completion of this
program, the special Allied deconcentration laws expired under the
Bonn conventions, as amended.' 30 Moreover, general Laws Nos.
56/78/96 neither prohibit mergers nor do they require administrative
approval of planned mergers. Because of this gap in the law, it is at
present possible for almost all enterprises (except the motion picture
Wiuerdigung des Milchfoerderungsfonds, 6 W.W. 352-53 (Germany 1956). On April 5,
1956, the Minister issued a cease and desist order against the Leuchtroehren Manu-
facturers Association which also had established certain rules of competition in restraint
of trade. 6 W.W. 355-56 (Germany 1956). On June 7, 1956, he issued another cease and
desist order against the Association of West German Building Material Dealers which
had promoted among its members a "non-discrimination contract" calling for fixed
prices, price lists, discounts and other restrictive practices. 6 W.W. 593-94 (Germany
1956). In a few other cases, the Federal Minister of Economics approved the introduc-
tion of such rules of competition but only after careful -examination and sometimes
under certain conditions. For a survey, see Peters, supra note 123, at 542. The state
ministers of economics, too, enforce the laws in their respective jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
id. at 541.
127. In September 1953, the Allied agency DIDEG approved an export and ra-
tionalization cartel agreement between two German net manufacturers. 2 HuBmR 769.
On June 30, 1954, DIDEG approved a crisis cartel agreement of the German soap
manufacturers. However, on June 9, 1955, the association of the soap manufac-
turers suspended the cartel agreement because the cartel had actually broken down.
Harz, Die Wettbewerbsordnuag der Konsumseifenindustrie, 5 W.W. 775 (Germany
1955).
On November 9, 1955, the successor of DIDEG, the Federal Minister of Eco-
nomics, granted a preliminary permission for a crisis cartel agreement of German
grain mills because of considerable excess capacity of the mills. 5 W.W. 785 (Germany
1955) ; see Note, Miteldenkartell und Kapazitaetsabbau, 6 W.W. 141 (Germany 1956).
On April 23, 1956, the Minister granted the first final permission for a cartel agreement
of twenty cheese producers concerning the export of Allgauer Emmentaler cheese. 6
W.W. 419-20 (Germany 1956); 11 D.B. 482 (Germany 1956). However, the permis-
sion expires on the date of the enactment of the German draft law or on March 31,
1959. Besides it is subject to other limitations. In other cases, the Minister has denied
his approval. On numerous further applications, no decision has so far been made.
For a survey, see Peters, supra note 123, at 542-43.
128. See pp. 656-62 infra.
129. For description and critical review, see authorities cited in notes 97 and 116
supra; Thiesing, Die Neuordtung der Eisen und Stahl ndustrie rn Gebiet der Bundes-
republik Deutschland (The Reorganization of the Iron and Steel Industry), 10 JuRIs-
TXNZEITUNG 412 (Germany 1955). An interesting but somewhat doubtful analysis of
the results of the deconcentration of the German coal and steel industry will be found
in PRITZKOLXIT, MAZNNIR, MAVCHUT, MONOPOL-HINT.R DEN TIMRIM DM WlST-
DUTSCHXN WIRTSCHAFT (Men, Powers, Monopolies-Behind the Doors of the West
German Industry) 162-98 (1953).
130. See note 119 supra.
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industry, the big banks 131 and Krupp) 3 2-- whether deconcentrated or
not-to build up new concentrations.
Detailed information on such a concentration movement is only
in part available. But there are strong indications that concentration
is generally starting anew or continuing.
Although with respect to the steel and coal industry the treaty
constituting the European Coal and Steel Community Is prohibits
concentrations impairing the maintenance of effective competition,
exemptions may be granted by the High Authority of the Com-
munity. Two factors seem to be decisive: the percentage of total
community output of the product which is controlled by the con-
centration, and the percentage of control it holds in a special market.
"Six per cent of total production and 12 per cent of special markets are
considered dangerous by the High Authority." 134 Actually, "no enter-
prise within the common market accounts for more than six per cent
of the total production." 133 Thus, the High Authority approved or
tolerated the reconcentration of numerous German steel and coal
companies. 3 6 Apart from that, it approved and regulated the estab-
131. See p. 651 and note 138 infra.
132. See note 136 infra.
133. Treaty of April 18, 1951, [1952] B.G.B. pt. II, at 445 (Germany) (hereinafter
cited as Treaty). Further provisions of the treaty prohibit unfair competitive prac-
tices, discriminatory prices and practices, and cartels of all kind. See id. arts. 3-5, 60,
65. The English wording of articles 65 and 66 is reprinted in AN'i-TRUsvr LAWs, A
COMPARATiV Sy:rmosium 579-85 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium
vol. 3, Friedmann ed. 1956) ; NnwMAN 478-85. For a comprehensive study of articles
65 and 66, see KIaN, DAS RZCIIT DR UNTRNEHMENSZUSAMMXNFASSUNGXN IN ER
MONrANUNION (1955).
134. Box, THn Fmsr THRx YXARS OV 'rx SCHUMAN PLAN 42 n.60 (1955).
135. Id. at 42.
136. It approved the reconcentration of the three main successor companies of
the Mannesmann A.G. steel and coal trust, namely the Mannesmann A.G.,
the Consolidation Bergbau A.G., and the Stahlindustrie und Maschinenbau
A.G., as well as the purchase of the majority of the stocks of the
Essener Steinkohlenberg-werke A.G. by said Consolidation Bergbau A.G. 9 Der
Volkswirt, Wirtschafts und Finanzzeitung [hereinafter D.V.J No. 2, at 26 (1955) ; 9
D.V. No. 24, at 26 (1955); 10 D.V. No. 27, at 27 (1956). The High Authority did
not object to the merger of two of the successor companies of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke
A.G., namely the steel firms Huettenwerke Phoenix A.G. and Rheinische Roehrenwerke
A.G. which are now called Phoenix-Rheinrohr A.G., Vereinigte Huetten und Roehren-
werke. 9 D.V. No. 21, at 29 (1955) ; 10 D.V. No. 30, at 25 (July 28, 1956). Two
other hitherto independent successor firms of the same trust have also been recon-
centrated, namely the steel companies Niederrheinische Huette A.G. and the August
Thyssen Huette A.G. 10 D.V. No. 27, at 29 (July 7, 1956); 10 D.V. No. 29, at 30
(July 21, 1956). Three other steel companies which succeeded the same trust are
reconcentrating, too, namely the Rheinstahl- Union Maschinen- und Stahlbau A.G.,
the Ruhrstahl A.G., and the Rheinisch-Westfaelische Eisen- und Stahlwerke A.G. 9
D.V. No. 19, at 16 (1955); 9 D.V. No. 23, at 22 (1955). The same is true of two of
the coal companies which succeeded the Vereinigte Stahlwerke trust, namely the
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G. and the Zeche (mine) Erin. 9 D.V. No. 36, at 24
(1955) ; 10 D.V. No. 36, at 26, 29 (Sept. 8, 1956). The High Authority tolerated the
reconcentration in part of the former steel and coal trust Kloeckner Werke A.G. 9
D.V. No. 14, at 25 (1955) ; 9 D.V. No. 47, at 26 (1955). The dissolved steel and coal
trust Hoesch A.G. was reestablished too. 9 D.V. No. 20, at 25 (1955); 9 D.V. No. 23,
1957] ANTITRUST LEGISLATION AND POLICY IN GERMANY 651
lishment of several German coal-selling cartels under article 65 of the
treaty.1
37
There are also indications of planned reconcentration of the
former three big banks and in the motion picture industry. 3 8 In-
terestingly, there are no reports on reconcentration of the successor
companies of the former chemical trust I. G. Farben.
Outside the coal, steel, chemical and motion picture industries and
the three big banks, no new deconcentration proceedings have been
initiated since 1950 either by Allied or German authorities. Thus,
there continue to exist numerous powerful enterprises 3 9 More-
over, as in the United States and elsewhere, the concentration
at 25 (1955). Besides, the High Authority approved the merger of the government-
owned coal company Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia A.G. with the Mine Emscher
Lippe. Thiesing, supra note 129, at 412. Furthermore, there is information on recon-
centration tendencies of the former steel trust Gutehoffnungshutte A.G. 9 D.V. No. 3,
at 24 (1955) ; 9 D.V. No. 25, at 25 (1955) ; 9 D.V. No. 31, at 29 (1955). The decon-
centration of the Krupp trust by sale of important assets has not yet been carried out
and further development cannot be foreseen. Hitherto, there was no reconcentration
of Krupp companies. 9 D.V. No. 37, at 26 (1955) ; 9 D.V. No. 41, at 28 (1955) ; 9
D.V. No. 44, at 30 (1955); 10 D.V. No. 27, at 48 (July 7, 1956). For further
information on the concentration movement, see Hoke Beh6rde toleriert Zusammen-
schluesse (High Authority Tolerates Concentrations), 10 D.V. No. 21, at 10 (March
1956) and the issues of Der Volkswirt since August 1956; cf. Coenen, Das Verhaeltnis
des Entflechtungsrechts in Deutschland mum Montanunionvertrag (The Relationship
Between the Deconcentration Law in Germany and the Schuman Plan Treaty), 6 W.W.
89 (Germany 1956).
137. The big Ruhr coal selling cartel Gemeinschaftsorganisation Rnhrkohle
(GEORG) and its six coal selling companies are no longer tolerated by the High
Authority. In 1953 these companies became the successors of the German Kohlenver-
kauf (DKV) which was established in 1945 and had succeeded the German coal selling
syndicates of 1919. See 1 Huait 559-62; 2 id. at 790-92. Actually, all three organiza-
tions had a monopoly in selling the Ruhr coal. The new solution as approved by the
High Authority under article 65 of the treaty provides for the dissolution of the
GEORG organization into three independent coal selling cartels with a common bureau
of limited powers. The detailed decisions of the High Authority are reprinted in 6
W.W. 368-84 (Germany 1956). See von Simson, Zur Reorganisation des Kohlenhandels
in der Montanunion, 6 W.W. 133, 325 (Germany 1956). For a survey on other cartels
and mergers approved by the High Authority, see von Simson, Kartelle nd Zutsafn-
inenschliisse in der Montanunion, 5 W.W. 401 (Germany 1955).
138. On April 18, 1956, the federal administration approved a new "big bank"
draft law which shall replace the present Law of March 29, 1952, [1952] B.G.B. pt. 1,
at 427 (Germany). Under the draft law, a merger of the three legally independent
successor institutions of each of the three big banks would be lawful. 6 W.W. 420-21
(Germany 1956). Among the three successor institutions of the former Dresdner Bank
a profit and loss pooling agreement came into force on January 1, 1955. MooDy, BANKC
AND FINANCIAL MANUAL 1537 (1956). Some tendencies to reconcentration are dis-
cernible in the German movie industry: for example, the theater-owning U.F.A. Com-
pany, apparently, starts making movies again. See German Screens, Barron's National
and Financial Weekly, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 19, col. 4. U.F.A. reconcentration plans after
repeal of the present "movie" law (Law of June 5, 1953, [1953] B.G.B. pt. I, at 276
(Germany)) are also reported in 10 D.V. No. 28, at 8 (July 14, 1956).
139. For examples, see PRITZKOLEIT, op. cit. supra note 129, at 421-23. There also
continues to exist the match monopoly of the German Zuendwarermnoiwpolgesellschaft,
established by Law of Jan. 29, 1930, [1930] R.G.B. pt. I, at 11 (Germany). Initial
attempts to dissolve it in the American Zone under military government were abandoned
under the Allied High Commission. The match monopoly also has been called a
compulsory cartel. Cf. Huber, Der Streit un das Zuendwarenmonopol (The Contro-
versy on the Match Monopoly), 9 Jutiss4NzmTuxG 375 (Germany 1954).
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process seems to have increased rather than decreased since World
War II."1 This is partly due to the recovery of German industry since
1948 141 and partly due to the general tendencies toward large-scale
enterprise. Considerable size is often considered essential for efficient
operation in manufacture, distribution and research.
Under these circumstances, the early enactment of a German anti-
trust law would seem desirable in order to prevent further concentra-
tions through mergers that would create market-dominating enterprises.
THE GERMAN DRAFT LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW
In principle, the draft law is based upon the same public policy as
Laws Nos. 56/78 and American antitrust law as interpreted in
recent times by the American federal courts. In the opinion of the
German administration, public interest is best safeguarded and pro-
moted by a "free and social market economy" (freie, soziale Mark-
twirtschaft). This concept is not based upon the "laissez-faire" theory
of the nineteenth century, nor does it recognize any justification for
a more or less state-planned or directed economy. Instead, it recognizes
the fact that, for the real functioning of the free and social market
economy, there must be a legal framework in which free competition is
promoted for the benefit of the public.
In other words, the concept of the free and social market economy
is based upon the establishment of certain "rules of the game" which
do not permit either unrestricted freedom of contract and association
or direct government interference. The administration recognizes,
however, that there are certain sections of the economy where, for
various reasons, this new concept of free competition can no longer
work satisfactorily under present economic and social conditions.
142
140. PRITZKOLEIT, op. cit. supra note 129, at 421-23. On a general tendency to con-
centration is reported in Konzentration im Stillen, 10 D.V. No. 35, at 6 (1956). With
respect to the soap industry, see 9 D.V. No. 39, at 23 (1955). A recent concentration of
the beer breweries of Berlin to two groups is reported in 5 W.W. 192 (Germany 1955).
Regarding concentration tendencies in the tobacco industry, see 3 W.W. 227 (Germany
1953) and 6 W.W. 595 (Germany 1956).
141. For an English survey, see Tuchtfeldt, The Development of the West German
Economy Since 1945, 1955 WEST GER. Soc. Scr. DIG. [hereinafter W.G.S.D.] 59 (Ger-
many) ; cf. Selected Bibliography on the Development of the German Economy Since
1945, 1955 W.G.S.D. 89 (Germany).
142. See Official Explanation of the Federal Administration to the Draft Law
(Amtliche Begrundung zum Gesetzesentwurf), DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE
No. 3462, 1. Wahlperiode app. 1, at 16-17 (1949); DEUTScHER BUNDESTAG DRUcK-
SACHE No. 1158, 2. Wahlperiode (1953) (hereinafter cited as Official Explanation),
reprinted in part in 2 W.W. 460-62 (Germany 1952). A very condensed English
version of the Official Explanation is published in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COmPARATIVE
SYmposium 230-37 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium vol. 3,
Friedmann ed. 1956).
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Therefore, it has provided certain statutory exemptions where the pro-
posed law is not to apply. This is true particularly:
(i) for the federal post and railways, and certain other enter-
prises engaged in public traffic, insofar as their services and
rates are regulated by statutes; 143
(ii) for certain vertical and cartel agreements in the field of
agriculture and forestry. However, the draft law sets up
detailed limitations for the admissibility of such cartels; 144
(iii) for certain governmental banks and for fiscal monopolies
insofar as their services and rates are regulated by other
statutes; 14
(iv) in the field of public utilities, where the Federal Minister of
Economics may issue statutory orders to the effect. that the
provisions on horizontal and vertical agreements in restraint
of trade shall not apply to certain agreements enumerated
in article 77.
Insofar as the treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel
Community 146 contains special provisions, the draft law does not
apply. 47
Horizontal Agreements (Cartels)
The Per Se Invalidity of Cartel Agreements
Section 1, articles 1-9 of the draft law deal in detail with cartels.
Article 1 provides that:
"Agreements made by enterprises for a common purpose and
understandings of associations of enterprises are null and void
insofar as they are suited to influence, by restraints of competition,
production or market conditions with respect to the trade in goods
or commercial services. This does not apply if a permission has
been granted." 4
The provision outlaws cartels in principle and therefore corres-
ponds in substance with section 1 of the Sherman Act 149 and article I
of the Laws Nos. 56/78.150 It contains no rule of reason test. As the
Sherman Act, the draft law prohibits a "contract" or "understanding."
143. Draft Law art. 74(1) 1.
144. Id. art. 75.
145. Id. art. 76, Nos. 1, 2.
146. See pp. 650-51 and notes 136, 137 supra.
147. Draft Law art. 76, No. 3. The special provisions are in Treaty arts. 3-5, 60,
65-66.
148. Pursuant to Draft Law arts. 2-5.
149. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
150. See p. 644 and note 95 supra.
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Mere parallel action would not seem to be sufficient. The terms "con-
spiracy" and "combination" do not exist in German terminology. If
there is no contract or understanding, there is no valid combination at
all.
The principle of cartel prohibition is the cardinal point of the
draft. It is based upon practical as well as theoretical considerations.
The practical reasons for an incipient prevention of cartels have been
explained already: the experiences made with a mere administrative
control of cartels were not satisfactory.'51
However, to prohibit cartels in principle means much more than
merely replacing one legal technique with another and probably more
effective one. The administration rather proceeds on a very different
theoretical assumption. It does not recognize a distinction between
"good" and "bad" cartels. They are all regarded as a danger per se
for the re-established "free and social market economy."
The main arguments against cartels are: they restrict the best
supply of the consumer with commodities by fixing artificial prices.
They restrict production and prevent the inherent tendency of modem
industry for intensified competition. Cartels destroy the selective func-
tion of free competition by actually subsidizing their economically
weaker members in fixing prices on the basis of the high costs of the
latter. Finally, cartels may acquire so much power that they are
able to influence general policy in a manner detrimental to the public
interest. They represent states within the state. Thereby, they
destroy the balance of a social order which is based upon at least some
degree of economic and social freedom (herrschaftsfreie Sozialord-
nung). That could help to make the country again ripe for a central
planned economy (Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft).
For these reasons, mere control of cartels seems insufficient to the
German administration, for such control would recognize cartels as a
justified form of combination in a "free market economy." Therefore,
a reasonable cartel policy cannot be restricted to the purely defensive
protection against abuse of cartel power. Such policy must seek to
prevent incipient cartels, and this is the basis of article 1.
However, even if one considers the principle of cartel prohibition
the best solution, there remains the further question whether this solu-
tion should be applied without permitting exceptions. Are there no
extraordinary cases where a cartel may be justified economically? Why
should prohibition not be modified by the rule of reason? Since
Germany lacks experience, it would seem to be of particular interest to
151. See pp. 639-41 supra.
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consider what sixty-five years of administration of the Sherman Act
show regarding this important question.
A review of the cases decided by the American federal courts re-
veals that the courts generally did not apply the rule of reason to cartel
agreements. This development began in 1927 with United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co.,' wherein the Supreme Court held that the
rule of reason test, as previously laid down for trusts,'5 was not also
applicable to price-fixing agreements (cartels).' This view was
subsequently reaffirmed in several cases, including United States v.
Socony Vacuum Oil Co.,'55 the second American Tobacco case,1
5
6
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 5 ' and Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc.5 ' The only case in which the
Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to a cartel is Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States,' involving a price cartel established under
emergency circumstances in the coal industry.
However, American (and German) scholars by no means take
the same unanimous view. On the contrary, the per se doctrine has
been more and more criticized in recent years. It has been proposed to
introduce the rule of reason in the statutes in order to prevent unjust
per se decisions detrimental to the industry and public. 6° In the
United States, the concept of "workable" or "effective" competition
offered not only a new theoretical basis for these attacks, but also seeks
152. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
153. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
154. "The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the
elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreason-
able prices." 273 U.S. at 396-97. (Emphasis added.)
155. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
156. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
157. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
158. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
159. 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; see p. 628 supra and p. 657 infra.
160. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Anti-Trust Policy, 50 Micxr. L. REv. 1139, 1156-58 (1952). For the German draft
law, the same proposal has been made, e.g., by Fikentscher, Die neitere Entwicklung
des amerikanischen Wettbewerbsrechts und der deutsche Kartellgesetzentwurf, 17
Z.G.H.K. 1, 9 (Germany 1955). There are many cases and writings in Germany on the
meaning and scope of the rule of reason as "imported" by the Allied antitrust law in
Germany. See, e.g., Moehring, Die Bedeutung der Rule of Reason im Kartellrecht,
5 W.W. 89, with English summary at 98-101 (Germany 1955). Some courts and
many writers interpret the rule of reason much broader than American courts and
writers do, though they often cite American decisions. Thus, Allied Laws Nos. 56/78
are frequently interpreted more broadly than their much more general and less rigorous
American counterparts. Accord, Kronstein, Aizerikanische Rechtsprechung zur Anti-
trustgestzgebung (American Cases Under the Antitrust Law), 4 W.W. 520, 525
(Germany 1954).
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to provide certain yardsticks by which the individual case may be
tested.-"'
The German administration does not neglect such ideas. How-
ever, it does not provide a general rule-of-reason clause in article 1,
because, in the administration's view, such a clause could open the
door to an interpretation which would possibly go far beyond the
purpose of the law to maintain competition as far as possible. Thus,
the administration selected another, narrower way to solve the prob-
lem: The law itself contains and determines in detail under which
circumstances certain cartels may be permitted in individual cases for
a limited time.
Exceptions for Crisis, Rationalization and Export Cartels
The draft law authorizes the Cartel Authority to approve, upon
application, three kinds of cartel agreements in individual cases. Such
permission may be granted for:
(i) crisis cartels, i.e., with "regard to enterprises engaged in pro-
duction, . . . if the applicant proves that, owing to a tem-
porary decline of sales which is not due to a fundamental
change in the demand, the arrangement is necessary to pre-
vent the total closing down of plants of the participating
enterprises or of considerable parts of such plants." 102
(ii) rationalization cartels, i.e., "if the applicant proves that the
arrangement serves to rationalize economic processes and is
especially suited to raise considerably the efficiency or to
foster considerably the economical operation of the partici-
pating enterprises from a technical, managerial or organiza-
161. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To
STUDY THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS 315-42 (1955); Clark, Toward a Concept of Work-
able Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REV. 241 (1940); Clark, The Orientation of Anti-
trust Policy, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 93 (1950); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A
Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 567 (1947); Adelman, Effective
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1948); Mason, The
Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. REv.
1265 (1949); Carlston, Antitrust Policy, A Problem in Statescraft, 60 YALE L.J.
1073 (1951); Handler, Antitrust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 N.Y. CiTY
BAR Ass'N RxcoRD 59 (1951); Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for
Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 405 (1951); Oppenheim, supra
note 160; MacDonald, Product Competition in the Relevant Market Under the Sher-
man Act, 53 MicH. L. REv. 69 (1954); Brewster, Enforceable Competition: Unruly
Reason or Reasonable Rules?, 46 Am. EcoN. REV. 482 (1956). See also Roper,
Wende in der U.S.-Antitrust Politik?, 3 W.W. 22 (Germany 1953); Schwenck,
Der Wandel der Antitrust Rechtsprechung in den Vereinigten Staaten, 3 W.W. 515
(Germany 1953); Fikentscher, Die neuere Eutwicklung des amerikanischen Wett-
bewerbsrechts und der deutsche Kartellgesentzentwurf, 17 Z.G.H.K. 1 (Germany
1955). The per se approach has been attacked in Germany, e.g., by 1 HUBER 331-33.
For a survey, see Fikentscher, Die deutsche Kartellrechtswssenschaft 1945-1954,
Eine kritische Ubersicht, 5 W.W. 205 (Germany 1955).
162. Draft Law art. 2.
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tional point of view and to improve thereby the satisfaction
of the demand." '6
(iii) export cartels, i.e., "if the applicant proves that the proposed
arrangement . . . is suited to protect or promote foreign
trade, especially by equalizing on world markets the com-
petitive position of participating enterprises in relation to
that of competitors who are not subject to this law or corres-
ponding legislation of another country. . . .
"No [such] permission . . . shall be granted for an ar-
rangement which comprises the trade in goods or commercial
services within the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany." 165
By these provisions, the draft law introduces a rule of reason
limited to three types of cartel agreements. Let us now see how the
federal courts of the United States decided such special cases.
As to crisis cartels, the Appalachian Coals case shows that the
Supreme Court, too, recognized-within narrow limits-crisis cartels.
There an important group of coal producers had established a price
cartel (in the form of a syndicate) in order to prevent complete ruin
of their industry by a dangerous price war. Article 2 of the draft law
would seem to have in mind such a factual emergency situation. It is
the applicant who has to prove the emergency. Moreover, exemption,
if any, cannot be granted for more than two years. However, upon
application the permission may be renewed once, but only in ex-
ceptional cases.166
With respect to rationalization cartels, there appear to be no cases
in the United States where the courts recognized this type of cartel
purpose as reasonable. The reasons for this exception are stated in
article 3 itself. Important restrictions are set up in article 4(1), which
provides:
"No permission within the meaning of Article 3 shall be
granted for agreements or for joint purchasing or marketing
organizations (syndicates) by which prices are being established
in a uniform manner, or, which result in uniform pricing methods,
or, which limit the sales or production of the participating enter-
prises."
Thus, approved rationalization cartels may not result in price fixing
or the establishment of sales or production quotas. It may be asked
whether, in effect, such pure rationalization cartels can really work
163. Id. art. 3.
164. Id. art. 5(1).
165. Id. art. 5(2).
166. Id. art. 7(1), (2).
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effectively. Besides, they may be permitted for three years only. Upon
application, however, the permission may be repeatedly extended for
another three years.'6 7 On the whole, this exception should not be
overemphasized in its importance. Under the present narrow statutory
limits it would probably not constitute a danger for effective com-
petition.
Export cartels seem to be much more problematic. The main
reason for permitting such cartels in individual cases is indicated by
article 5 itself: 168 the existence of monopoly and organized competitors
abroad which are not subject to German jurisdiction under the draft
law' 69 or corresponding foreign legislation. Thus, article 5 intends
167. Ibid.
168. See text at note 164 supra.
169. With respect to the applicability to foreign enterprises, the German draft law
provides: "The Law shall apply to enterprises whose seat of management is abroad to
the extent as the effects of their business activities extend into the Federal Territory,
in particular, in so far as they maintain, within the Federal Territory, statutory repre-
sentatives [gesetzliche Vertreter], attorneys [Bevollinaechtigte] or agents for the pur-
pose of participating in the markets within the Federal Republic." Draft Law art.
73(2). The provision does not expressly mention foreign cartels. However, article
73(2) would seem to apply also to pure foreign combinations in restraint of competi-
tion, for the individual members of such combinations (cartels) are "enterprises"
within the meaning of the law. Therefore, the proposed law will apply at least insofar
as such members of foreign cartels carry on the activities agreed upon in the cartel
agreement, and insofar as the effects of these activities extend into the federal terri-
tory. In other words, such activities of foreign cartels would be illegal per se under
article 1.
Article 73 (2) does not expressly answer the question whether such activities of
foreign cartels must have direct effects upon the commerce within the federal territory
or whether indirect effects, too, would be sufficient. However, the wording of article
73(2), in particular the examples enumerated therein as well as the difficulties which
would arise from the enforcement of the proposed law abroad (conflict with the local
rule of law) and political considerations (cooperation and friendship with foreign
countries), would seem to indicate that the draft law will only apply as to direct con-
sequences of foreign activities of enterprises and combinations upon commerce within
the federal territory. For example, a foreign cartel which would directly limit imports
into the Federal Republic would seem to fall within the scope of the proposed law. On
the other hand, if the Argentine meat producers established a combination for the
purpose of raising considerably the prices of meat exported to Germany, the draft
law would seem not to be applicable. Such action would be carried on within the
territorial limits of Argentina and scarcely have direct legal effects extending into the
federal territory, although it is obvious that the economic effects are the same as if the
action were carried on by an Argentine import cartel participating in the German meat
market but also established abroad.
Such an interpretation would correspond with the legal treatment of purely foreign
combinations in the United States. While foreign cartels directly limiting imports into
the United States fall within the scope of the antitrust laws, United States v. Aluminum
Co., 148 F.2d 416, 442-48 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F.
Supp. 753, 890-91 (D.N.J. 1949), they are not applicable to indirect restraints upon
the commerce of the United States, Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Aluminum Co., supra at 443, General
Milk Co., 44 F.T.C. 1355, 1416 (1947) ; Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad: The Anti-
trust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 493, 531-35 (1953) and
writings cited therein. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws,
69 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1956).
However, one important difference may be stated: in the United States, the
foreign actors must intend to affect the commerce of the United States, United States v.
Aluminum Co., supra at 424; Hale & Hale, supra at 533 and authorities cited therein,
whereas article 73(2) of the German draft law does not require any intent.
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to enable German manufacturers and producers to enter the world
markets on more equal terms with their organized foreign competitors
and customers.
The Official Explanation of the administration 'I indicates that
article 5 has been introduced as a parallel to the Webb-Pomerene Act. 1
Therefore, the interpretation given to this act by the American federal
courts is of particular interest.
Section 2 of the Webb-Pomerene Act provides that the Sherman
Act shall not apply to an association formed for the sole purpose of
engaging in export trade, provided that no restraint of export trade
results adversely to the interest of any domestic competitor and pro-
vided also that there is no effect upon prices within the United States.
Similar theories underlie the act and article 5 of the German draft law,
i.e., "that the existence of monopsony abroad justifies an export monop-
oly because bargaining between those two units will come nearer to
achievement of free-market equilibrium prices than will attempts by
American producers to act singly." 172 The Webb-Pomerene Act,
furthermore, regulates how such export cartels shall be formed and
subjects them to a general surveillance of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. However, unlike the German draft law, the act does not prescribe
prior approval of export cartels by the FTC.
A review of the cases decided by the federal courts of the United
States shows that the act has been interpreted very restrictively. In
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,'73 while the district
court indicated that an agreement by the manufacturers of a particular
industry to export exclusively through a jointly-organized export com-
pany on a basis of assigned quotas was authorized by the Webb-
Pomerene Act, the court held that a combination of American manu-
facturers controlling four-fifths of the export trade in coated abrasives
to establish jointly-owned factories abroad was not "an association
entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade" under
section 1 of the act.' 74 Furthermore, the court held that an export
170. See note 142 supra.
171. 40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1952); see Hale & Hale, .rpra
note 169, at 510-23 and authorities cited therein; Jones, The Webb-Pomerene Act, J.
PoL. Ecox. 754 (1920).
172. Hale & Hale, siupra note 169, at 514-15, citing Hearings Before the Temporary
National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 20, at 10935 (1939). Hale and
Hale then proceed to criticize this theory of countervailing power in a balanced-force
polity.
173. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
174. For other cases not involving the question of the applicability of the Webb-
Pomerene Act, but concerning dispersion of American firms abroad, see Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (agreements dividing territories and
fixing prices between American corporation and foreign subsidiaries created jointly
with native competitors already established in the field held to violate Sherman Act) ;
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cartel as first described was unlawful and not covered by the Webb-
Pomerene Act when used in con]unction with a program whereby the
export company chose not to export to areas where jointly-owned
foreign factories could supply foreign-made abrasives at a greater
profit.'7 5
Apart from that, a Webb-Pomerene cartel may undertake no
activities which limit the opportunities of independent exporters. Thus,
an agreement by the members of such an export cartel, if they are
producers, to sell exclusively to the cartel is not legally binding. The
agreement must leave the members free to sell to independent ex-
porters.
76
These decisions would seem valuable in interpreting article 5 of
the German draft law. Unfortunately, however, the wording of article
5 is not as clear and exact as that of section 2 of the Webb-Pomerene
Act, although the latter also leaves many questions open. While sec-
tion 2 of the act precisely defines the term "export trade," article 5 of
the draft merely reads: "that the arrangement is suited to protect or
promote foreign trade. .... " It is thus quite ambiguous and might
open the door for an interpretation much broader than the Webb-
Pomerene Act would permit by its narrow wording.
It even would seem questionable whether article 5 prohibits or
permits exemptions for import cartels, for the term "foreign trade"
may well include export as well as import. In any event, para-
graph (2) of article 5 prohibits exemptions for arrangements which
comprise the trade within the territory of the republic. In the
United States, it is now settled that a cartel among importers will be
tested by the same standards as those applied by the courts to domestic
combinations. 7
With respect to international cartels, further questions arise. It
is true, article 1 of the German draft implicitly prohibits in principle the
participation of German enterprises in international cartels. It corres-
ponds, therefore, with recent American decisions which hold it illegal
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(duPont's joint creation with non-native foreign investor of subsidiaries abroad held to
constitute territorial division and illegal restraint of trade) ; Hale & Hale, supra note
169, at 526-28.
175. The Federal Trade Commission has reached a similar result in General Milk
Co., 44 F.T.C. 1355, 1419 (1947).
176. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 74-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); Phosphate Export Ass'n, 42 F.T.C. 555, 841-42, 843, 847 (1946);
American Exjort Door Corp. v. John A. Gauger Co., 154 Wash. 514, 524, 283 Pac.
462, 465 (1929) ; Hale & Hale, supra note 169, at 521-22.
177. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Hale & Hale, supra
note 169, at 504-10.
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for producers in the United States to join with competitors abroad in
dividing markets, fixing prices, and doing other restrictive activities. 78
However, article 5 of the draft law does not reveal whether an ex-
emption granted under this provision would enable German export
cartels or their members to join international cartels. It would seem
that article 5 does not justify such exception to the general policy of
the proposed law, in view of the limited purpose which article 5 pur-
sues.' 79 International trade should not be dominated by private in-
dustrial governments. Friendship and cooperation among the peoples
of the world can scarcely be established as long as special interests deter-
mine the exchange of goods. International cartels to "promote or pro-
tect foreign trade" (if that purpose may ever be really performed by an
international cartel which would seem to have different purposes)
may easily have reactions on the domestic markets detrimental to the
public interest. This is true when the producers of a country are al-
located restricted quotas or are wholly prevented from participating
in foreign markets. It is equally obvious that it should not be left to
international cartels to determine the conditions upon which foreign
goods may be imported in the domestic markets.
Several further reasons for this view are given in United States
v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n." There it was held that an
agreement between a Webb-Pomerene organization and foreign com-
petitors to share markets in fixed percentages and at established
prices was illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that the
Webb-Pomerene Act did not cover such joinder.' Thus, in the
United States the law today is that no export cartel permitted under
the Webb-Pomerene Act may join an international cartel.'"2
On the whole, it would seem that too much is left to the ad-
ministration of article 5 by the Cartel Authority. Only a restric-
tive interpretation of this provision, considering carefully the basic
policy and purpose underlying the proposed law, may prevent the
inherent dangers arising from export cartels of whatever type and the
repercussions on domestic trade if there are too many of them.
178. United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1009-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) ; Hale & Hale, supra note 169, at 538-41.
179. Contra, 1 HuB R 401 (without giving reasons).
180. 86 F. Supp. 59, 65-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
181. Id. at 65-71, 74; see United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947, 964 (D. Mass. 1950).
182. Hale & Hale, supra note 169, at 542; see authorities cited in id. at 542 n.
180.
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In addition to the specific limitations provided in the proposed
statute for export, rationalization and crisis cartels subject to a possible
exemption, the following general provisions apply to all of them. The
agreement must be in writing." Exemptions may be granted subject
to limitations, conditions and requirements.18 4  They may be revoked
ex officio or be amended under certain circumstances."" With the
approval of the Cartel Authority, any participant of the cartel agree-
ment may terminate it for important reasons (reasons of weight),
"especially if the terminating party's freedom of economic action is
being unreasonably restricted or if its fundamental right to equal treat-
ment with other parties is impaired." "I Approved cartels are pro-
hibited from impairing the freedom of economic action of a nonpartici-
pating enterprise by restraining it unfairly from engaging in business
activities which are usually open to similar enterprises or by treating it
differently from similar enterprises.18 7  Approved cartels or individual
enterprises are also prohibited from coercing an enterprise to become
a member of a cartel'188
Finally, it is unlawful for an approved cartel to express or dis-
seminate recommendations as to price fixing or price-fixing methods,
limitations on production or sales, or discriminatory activities against
other enterprises. 89 Thus, every approved crisis, rationalization and
export cartel is subject to a considerable control exercised by the
Cartel Authority.'
Vertical Agreements
Section 2, articles 10-16 of the draft law regulates another kind of
restrictive business practice: the so-called vertical agreement in restraint
of competition, i.e., all kinds of individual agreements between members
of different trade levels (e.g., manufacturer and wholesaler, wholesaler
183. Draft Law art. 27.
184. Id. art. 7(3).
185. Id. art. 7(4).
186. Id. art. 8.
187. Id. art. 23(1).
188. Id. art. 23(2).
189. Id. art. 24(1). For exceptions, see id. art. 24(2). With respect to the illegality
of such practices in the United States, see Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297
U.S. 553 (1936) ; Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) ;
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) ; Tag Mfrs. Insti-
tute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
190. Cf. Official Explanation, reprinted in 2 W.W. 466-67 (Germany 1952).
Recently, the Economic Committee of the German Bundestag (lower house) proposed
some amendments to the provisions on crisis, rationalization and export cartels. See 5
W.W. 784 (Germany 1955); 6 W.W. 60-61 (Germany 1956); 6 W.W. 147-49 (Ger-
many 1956). However, these provisions are being discussed anew by the Committee
since January 1957. See note 21 supra.
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and retailer) as contrasted with collective agreements between members
of the same level of business (e.g., producers) which are also called
cartels and are not subject of section 2 of the proposed law.
The draft law distinguishes between two groups of vertical agree-
ments. Resale price maintenance agreements and agreements concern-
ing acquisition or use of patents or registered designs which impose
restrictions upon the assignee or licensee beyond the scope of the
grant are unlawful per se.' 91  Other vertical agreements (tying
clauses, supply and requirements agreements, exclusive arrangements)
may be invalidated by the Cartel Authority from case to case to the
extent that they unreasonably restrict the freedom of economic action
of one party to the agreement or of any other enterprise.
19 2
Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictive Patent Agreements
The regulation provided in article 10 includes particularly resale
price-maintenance agreements. They are illegal per se. Article 10 is
intended to prevent ipso iure any abuse of the economic power of one
party over the other. Such restrictive practices are often defended under
the principle of freedom of contract. But actually it is precisely this
freedom which may be easily abused by a more powerful manufacturer
or producer to restrict freedom of economic action and contract of the
weaker party to the agreement. The latter's freedom to contract is
no real freedom if he is under economic pressure.
The regulation of article 10 corresponds in substance to the
attitude taken by the courts of the United States. They hold price-
fixing agreements illegal per se whether horizontal or vertical.193
The draft law, however, grants one important statutory exemption
from the general prohibition of resale price-maintenance agreements:
individual resale price-maintenance agreements on branded articles
would be lawful if they are competing with similar goods of other
producers or dealers. 94 Following an old tradition, the draft law also
permits resale price-maintenance with respect to copyrighted articles,
such as books.'95
191. Draft Law arts. 10, 15.
192. Id. art. 13.
193. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143-44 (1948);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 719-21 (1944); cases dis-
cussed at p. 655 supra. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911) is the only case where the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to
vertical price-fixing agreements. The case was decided six weeks before Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), where the court introduced the rule of reason
as to trusts.
194. Draft Law art. 11(1) 2. In id. art 11(2) is given a definition of the term
"branded article."
195. Id. art. 11(1) 2.
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In effect, the exemption of resale price maintenance of branded
articles again substantially corresponds to the present legal situation in
the United States. Since 1931, forty-five of the states enacted so-called
fair trade laws which permit resale price maintenance as to branded ar-
ticles with few differentiations.'96 By the Miller-Tydings Act 17 and the
McGuire Act, 198 the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act ' 99 have been amended in order to legalize fair trade in interstate
commerce to the extent that the state fair trade laws permit resale price
maintenance in the respective states.
But there is one difference between the two systems: the draft
law does not contain the famous non-signer clause. In Germany,
individual resale price-maintenance contracts will be necessary.
Apart from that, resale price maintenance seems to be as con-
troversial in Germany as it is in the United States. The arguments
pro and con are the same. Fair trade, it is contended, prevents
"ruinous" price competition. It protects the product's good will owned
and introduced by the producer through product quality and advertis-
ing. 0 0 Besides, and even more important under modern distribution
methods, the small retailer must be protected against discount houses,
department stores and others. On the other hand, prohibition of resale
price maintenance is demanded in order to re-establish price competition
on the dealers' level and thus to promote progress in distribution, to
prevent excessive mark-ups and unreasonable expenses for adver-
tising.
20 1
As to mark-ups, the German draft law introduces a provision not
existing in the fair trade laws. Article 12 authorizes the Cartel
Authority to invalidate ex officio resale price maintenance agreements
if mark-ups are agreed upon "which are unjustified by market condi-
tions, especially in relation to mark-ups on similar but not price-fixed
goods." The provision is based upon experience in the United States
where mark-ups of fair-traded articles have often been unreasonably
high.2°  If mark-ups are found to be unreasonable, the Cartel Au-
196. Only Missouri, Vermont, Texas and the District of Columbia did not enact
fair trade acts. However, in the last few years, the highest courts of nine states held
their fair trade laws-wholly or partially-unconstitutional.
197. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
198. 66 STAT. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
199. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1952).
200. Cf. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936).
201. E.g., FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945); REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 149-55
(1955). As to the situation in Germany, see, e.g., ROPER, VERTIKALE PREISBINDUNG
Bar MARxENARTIKELN (Resale Price Maintenance of Branded Articles) (1955).
202. Official Explanation art. 12, No. 1.
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thority, under article 12, does not fix the proper mark-up, but issues
an order to cease and desist from the established resale price mainte-
nance system.2m
Agreements concerning the acquisition or use of patents or reg-
istered designs (Gebrauchsmuster) are void under article 15 of the
draft law if they:
"impose upon the acquirer or licensee any restrictions in his
business conduct which go beyond the legal substance of the
protected privilege (Schutsrecht); restrictions pertaining to the
type, scope, quantity, territory or period of exercise of the pro-
tected privilege shall not be deemed to exceed its legal sub-
stance." 204
Article 15(1) would seem to prevent a patentee generally from
extending his privilege beyond the scope of the grant in cases in which
he could not do so in the United States." 5  Since this prohibition is
contained in the proposed antitrust law, it can be assumed that it is
based primarily on antitrust grounds rather than on the broader ground
of patent abuse. 06 Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether it would
be necessary to prove the anti-competitive effect of an agreement so long
as it was shown to exceed the scope of the grant.
Corresponding to American law, article 15 (1) per"mits territorial
subdivisions 2 07 but, in addition, includes some exceptions concerning
the manner, scope and quantity of the licensee's use of his privilege
which are not quite clear. Additional difficulties might be created by the
fact that article 15 applies not only to licensees but also to assignees
or "acquirers," as the law puts it. Does it mean, as the article
seems to say, that the assignee of all rights under the patent for the
entire territory could be limited, for example, concerning quantity or
quality of the products he manufactures under the assigned patent?
Could restrictions be imposed on him regarding his terms of sale?
Section 2 of article 15 makes section 1 expressly inapplicable to:
1) restrictions imposed on licensee or assignee to the extent and
so long as they are justified by the patentee's interest in a
technically unobjectionable use of the patent;
203. Id. No. 2.
204. Draft Law art. 15(1).
205. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
206. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) ; B. B. Chemical
Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) and earlier cases such as Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
207. See Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
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2) fixing the prices of the licensee 2"8 as well as the assignee;
3) agreements for the exchange of know-how and grant-backs of
improvement and "parallel" (related) patents, 2 9 provided
that the obligation is not exclusive;
4) express agreements against challenging the patent's validity. 1 °
A licensor, of course, has a justified interest in supervising, to
some extent, the technical quality of the licensee's product or services;
but it cannot be foreseen to what extent section 2(1) may furnish
arguments for certain tying arrangements.2 1' The article leaves in
doubt, for example, the legality of package licensing 2 and of cross-
licensing and mutual price-fixing, particularly in the case of dominating
companies or industry-wide pools. 213 Interestingly, article 16 makes
article 15 applicable, mutatis mutandis, to unpatented secret processes. 1 4
Tying Clauses and Exclusive Dealing Agreements
These types of vertical agreements are not declared illegal per se
by the draft law. Article 13 empowers the Cartel Authority to in-
validate such agreements either on petition of a party to the agreement
or ex officio, if the arrangement unreasonably (unduly) restricts the
economic freedom of one of the parties or of any other enterprise.
In the United States, such agreements may fall within the scope of
section 3 of the Clayton Act 215 and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.
208. This, presumably, would establish for Germany the rule of United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) and eliminate doubts created in the United
States by implications from United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948)
and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
209. Cf. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947).
210. Query, whether a licensee or assignee could nevertheless challenge the validity
of the patent if his promise not to do so were part of an otherwise illegal license or as-
signment contract. Cf. Mac Gregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402
(1947) ; Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
211. Cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936).
212. Cf. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950).
213. Cf. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
214. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911);
cf. Foundry Services, Inc. v. Beneflut Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953).
For a detailed study of the whole field, see LisaxmN cHT, PATUNTS, LIZEN-
ZVERTRAGE UND VERBOT VON WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, EINE VERGLEICHENDE
DARSTLLUNG DrR RaCHTSLAGE IN DEUTSCHLAND, GROSSBRITANN]ZN UND D4N VgR-
ZINIGT=N STAATXN (Patents, License Agreements and Prohibition of Restraints of
Competition, a Comparative Study on the Legal Situation in Germany, Great Britain
and the United States) (1953). See also Lieberknecht, Patentvertrage im deutschen
Kartellgesetrentumrf, 3 W.W. 142 (Germany 1953) (with English summary).
215. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
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A typical example of a .tying agreement is the case of Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States.10 International owned two patents
on two machines for utilization of salt products. Each of these machines
was under leases requiring the lessees to purchase from International
all unpatented salt and salt tablets consumed in the leased machines.
The Supreme Court ruled that under both the Sherman Act and sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act the arrangement was illegal, since " . it
is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market. . ,, 2117 Thus, the "decision, at least as to contracts tying
the sale of a nonpatented to a patented product, rejected the necessity
of demonstrating economic consequences. ,, 218
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,2 19 however,
the Supreme Court upheld a tying agreement for newspaper advertising
as not violative of the Sherman Act. 22' The defendant, publisher of the
only morning daily newspaper in New Orleans and one of the two
evening papers, had introduced a unit system requiring that classified
and national display advertisements be placed in both papers. The
Court interpreted International Salt and other earlier cases as holding
that a tying agreement is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for
the "tying" product and if a substantial volume of commerce in the
"tied" product is restrained."' The Court found that the morning and
evening newspapers were not differentiated products and, therefore,
operated in the same market. Thus, it held that the Times-Picayune's
control of forty per cent of the advertising linage was not sufficient to
constitute the market control necessary for a violation of section 1.
The Court also stated that the system lacked the "common core
of the adjudicated unlawful tying arrangements," the "forced purchase
of a second distinct commodity with the desired purchase of a domi-
nant 'tying' product, resulting in economic harm to competition in the
216. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
217. Id. at 396. Although the case involved the tying of unpatented articles to
patented machines, it would seem not to fall within the scope of the per se prohibition of
article 15 of the proposed law, discussed at pp. 665-66 supra. Article 15 covers only
"agreements concerning the acquisition or use of patents" (in other words of the patent
right), but not agreements concerning the acquisition or use of patented articles. How-
ever, it is doubtful that agreements concerning the acquisition or use of patents should
be more objectionable (namely, null and void per se) than agreements concerning the
acquisition of use of patented articles which are merely subject to the rule of reason
test of article 13. Accord, LEERKNEcHT, PATENTE, LIZENZVERTRAGE UND VERBOr VON
WEMTEWERSBESCHMANXUNGEN, EINE VERGIMCHENDE DARSTELLUNG DER RECHTSLAGE
iN DEUTScHLAND, GRoSSBUTANNmN UND DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN 302 (1953).
218. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 304 (1949).
219. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
220. The case was not brought under § 3 of the Clayton Act because the Govern-
ment elected to proceed not under the Clayton but the Sherman Act. Id. at 609.
221. Id. at 608-09.
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'tied' market." 22 This view approaches the attitude taken by the
German draft law, which stresses the economic freedom of both parties
to the arrangement and of any other competitor or enterprise.
Dominant position in the market for the "tying" product, how-
ever, and restriction of a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied"
product are the Court's dual standards for a Sherman Act violation.
But, as to "the narrower standards expressed in section 3 of the
Clayton Act," the Court observed by way of dicta that either of these
tests is sufficient "because from either factor the requisite potential
lessening of competition is inferred." I Thus, as to section 3 of
the Clayton Act, the Court corresponds with the holding in Inter-
national Salt in substance and, in addition, emphasizes the importance
of the question whether there was buyer coercion.
With regard to exclusive dealing agreements, Justice Frankfurter
introduced in the Standard Stations case "4 the so-called quantitative
substantiality doctrine. In this case, Standard had entered into
contracts with many independent gasoline dealers under which they had
to purchase from Standard all their requirements of one or more prod-
ucts. The issue was whether the requirement of showing that the effect
of the agreements "may be to substantially lessen competition" (section
3 of the Clayton Act) may be met simply by proof that a substantial
portion of commerce was affected (quantitative analysis), or whether it
must also be demonstrated that competitive activity has actually
diminished or probably will diminish (qualitative analysis).
The Court recognized that requirements agreements, unlike tying
clauses, may well be of economic advantage to buyers as well as to
sellers and indirectly to the consuming public.2 However, for prac-
tical difficulties in the application of the qualitative test, the Court
decided in favor of the quantitative substantiality doctrine."' In
result, this decision comes very close to the holdings in International
Salt and Times-Picayune that tying agreements restricting a substantial
volume of commerce in the "tied" product are illegal under section 3
of the Clayton Act.
On the whole, section 3 of the Clayton Act and the attitude taken
by the Supreme Court as to tying clauses and exclusive dealing ar-
rangements would seem not to correspond with the regulation provided
222. Id. at 614.
223. Id. at 608-09. Thus, unlike in the International Salt case, the Court drew a
distinction between the scope of the two acts.
224. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
225. Id. at 305-08.
226. Id. at 308-14; accord, Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922
(1952).
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in article 13 of the German draft law. The test in the latter is not
whether a substantial volume of commerce has been or probably will
be foreclosed by such agreements; the decisive factor is rather whether
such arrangement unreasonably restricts the freedom of economic
action of one party to the agreement or of a competitor. Thus, article
13 introduces the rule of reason and thereby looks only to the individual
enterprise and its freedom from economic coercion as buyer or seller,
while section 3 of the Clayton Act requires that the effect of the
arrangement "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." No such effect is
necessary under article 13.
The German regulation apparently is based upon the assumption
that, if there is no unreasonable restriction of freedom of economic
action by such arrangement, there will be no substantial lessening of
competition. If this is correct, it is sufficient to prove the unreason-
ably coercive effect of the tying clause or exclusive dealing agreement.
Then, it is not necessary to prove also that the effect of such arrange-
ment may be to substantially lessen competition. Thus, the German
draft law would avoid the difficulties arising from the interpretation
and application of this rule which led to the questionable quantitative
substantiality test, and yet arrive at similar results. Obviously it is
easier to decide whether an individual arrangement unduly restricts
the economic freedom of one of the parties or of a competitor than to
determine whether it may substantially lessen competition. Apart from
that, the rule of reason test as to freedom of economic action may
secure an appropriate case by case examination, excluding all per se
tendencies 1 and also covering, perhaps, cases where there is economic
coercion but no substantial lessening of competition. For these rea-
sons, the German solution would seem preferable.
Enterprises Which Dominate the Market
Competition may be restricted not only by combination of several
independent enterprises, but also by a single enterprise. While
the draft law in principle outlaws horizontal combinations per se--
whether or not they constitute monopolies-single enterprises al-
ready existing " are only subject to administrative control if they
227. See dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 321-23 (1949) and the remarkable dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas, id. at 315.
228. As to the establishment of future monopoly enterprises by means of merger,
another regulation is provided. See pp. 676-82 infra.
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(i) are in a position to dominate the market, and (ii) abuse this power
by certain restrictive activities. '
An enterprise which dominates the market is defined by article
17 as one that:
"is not faced by any substantial competition for any type of goods
or commercial services, especially if an enterprise is in a position,
by reason of the share of the market held by it, to determine the
production of a particular commodity or the prices and terms for
a particular commodity or commercial service, without having
to take competitors into serious consideration and to influence
thereby the market tangibly." 29
This definition of the term "enterprise which dominates the
market" would seem to correspond in substance with the definitions of
monopoly as laid down in recent decisions of the courts of the United
States, particularly in the first and second Alcoa cases. ° "In con-
sidering the matter of monopoly power, two ingredients are of out-
standing significance: vi.., the power to fix prices and the power to
exclude competitors." "' The first "ingredient" corresponds exactly
to the German definition. The second is undoubtedly implicitly in-
cluded.
In addition, the federal courts require that there be shown "a
purpose or intent to exercise the power . . ." which "is present if
the acquisition or retention" of the power comes about as a con-
sequence of defendant's conduct or business arrangements." 2 Such
an intent, however, is not required by article 17 of the draft law.
Article 17 does not introduce the term "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize," but only speaks of "enterprise which dominates the
market," whether or not intentionally. Furthermore, the draft law
contains no criminal provision and thus need not require an intent.
The considerable difficulties which may arise from the proof of intent
to monopolize, therefore, are avoided under the draft law.
It is not clear whether oligopoly enterprises, too, fall within the
scope of article 17. Therefore, the federal administration proposed an
additional clause which expressly includes oligopoly enterprises in the
regulation of article 17. This amendment to article 17 reads:
229. Draft Law art. 17(1).
230. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) and United
States v. Aluminum Co., 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
231. Id. at 342; see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-14
(1946).
232. Not the abuse. See Draft Law art. 17(1) 1-3.
233. United States v. Aluminum Co., 91 F. Supp. 333, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-14 (1946).
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"Two or more enterprises which cooperate by parallel behavior so
as to affect the market substantially shall also be deemed to
dominate the market within the meaning of article 17." 24
By this definition, the scope of article 17 would seem to be considerably
broadened. Today, oligopolies do exist in many important branches
of industry, while monopoly occurs rarely. Therefore, it seems very
important to prevent oligopoly enterprises from abusing their power.
The difficult problem of the determination of the relevant market
will be considered later in connection with the provisions on mergers.2 6
As to the legal consequences of market domination, article 17
provides that the Cartel Authority may prohibit such enterprise from:
"1. . . . demanding or offering, in connection with agreements
on such goods or commercial services, prices established under
abuse of its dominating position;
"2. . . . applying, in connection with agreements on such goods
or commercial services, terms and conditions established
under abuse of its dominating position;
"3 . . . making the conclusion of agreements on such goods or
commercial services dependent upon the purchase by the
other participating party of goods or services which tech-
nically or according to trade customs do not belong together."
The essence of this provision is that certain abuses of monopolies and
oligopolies can be prohibited, but that monopolies cannot be dissolved
and can be prevented only if they are achieved through mergers.237
Again, a review of the position taken by the courts of the United
States as to the monopoly problem may be useful in predicting how
the German regulation may work and whether it will be sufficient to
234. For the German text of the clause, see DtuTscE ; BUNDXs'AG DRUCKSAC S
No. 1158, 2. Walilperiode app. 3, at 81 (1953), reprinted in 5 W.W. 313-14 (Germany
1955).
235. The Bundesrat (upper house) proposed a different oligopoly clause. It reads:
"(2) Two or more enterprises shall also be deemed to dominate the market, if, for
factual reasons, substantial competition does not exist between them and if, as a
whole, they are within the meaning of Para. (1)."
For the German text of this proposal, see DZuTscHrM BUNDCSTAG DRUCKSACHM
No. 1158, 2. Wahlperiode app. 2, at 66 (1953). For several reasons the oligopoly
clause of the administration seems to be preferable. See Rasch, Der Begriff des
Oligopols in Kartellgesetenhwerf, 6 W.W. 3 (Germany 1956); see Ohm, Oligopolis-
tische Preisfiihrerschaft ind Kartellgesetz, 5 W.W. 20 (Germany 1955).
The Economic Policy Committee of the Bundestag (lower house) worked out the
following oligopoly clause which represents a certain combination of the clauses of
the administration and the Upper House: "(2) Two or more enter-prises shall also be
deemed to dominate the market (a) if, for factual reasons, substantial competition does
not exist between them, or (b) if, by parallel behavior, they substantially influence the
market." For the German wording, see 6 W.W. 271 (Germany 1956).
236. See pp. 679-81 infra.
237. See Draft Law art. 18, discussed at pp. 676-82 infra.
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fight monopoly successfully. Such a review reveals considerable dif-
ferences between the two systems.
The Supreme Court originally held that: "The law, however, does
not make mere size of a corporation, however impressive, or the exist-
ence of unexerted power on its part, an offense, when unaccompanied by
unlawful conduct in the exercise of its power." 2s To this extent the
German draft law fully corresponds with the interpretation given to
the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court.
However, the situation has changed since 1932, when Justice
Cardozo said in United States v. Swift & Co.: 29 "Mere size, according
to the holding of this court, is not an offense against the Sherman Act
unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to monopoly .
but size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be
ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the
past." 240
In the first Alcoa case,241 Judge Learned Hand for the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit went still further in saying:
"[I]t is no excuse for 'monopolizing' a market that the monopoly
has not been used to extract from the consumer more than a 'fair'
profit. The Act has wider purposes. . . . [Congress] did not
condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbade all..
Starting, however, with the authoritative premise that all con-
tracts fixing prices are unconditionally prohibited, the only pos-
sible difference between them and a monopoly is that while a
monopoly necessarily involves an equal, or even greater, power to
fix prices, its mere existence might be thought not to constitute an
exercise of that power. That distinction is nevertheless purely
formal; it would be valid only so long as the monopoly remained
wholly inert; it would disappear as soon as the monopoly began
to operate; for, when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at
all-it must sell at some price and the only price at which it could
sell is a price which it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its
exercise must needs coalesce. Indeed it would be absurd to con-
demn such contracts unconditionally, and not to extend the con-
238. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927). See
also United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) ; cf. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), where the abuse of their dominating power by the oil and
tobacco trusts and not their mere size led to dissolution. The activities of the two
trusts about correspond to their acts prohibited in article 17(1) 1-3 of the German
draft law.
239. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
240. Id. at 116.
241. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), finally decided
under a statute authorizing the circuit court of appeals to render a decision "in lieu of a
decision" by the Supreme Court, because there was no quorum of Justices of the
Supreme Court qualified to participate in the consideration of the case on its merits.
58 STAT. 272 (1944) (later amended by 62 STAT. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. §29 (1952)).
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demnation to monopolies; for the contracts are only steps toward
that entire control which monopoly confers: they are really
partial monopolies." 242
This is exactly the argument which could be made against the
different treatment of cartels and single monopoly enterprises by the
German draft law. Is it not economically and legally unjustified to
declare unlawful per se a monopoly achieved by agreement 2 4 and at
the same time to permit a monopoly established by a single enterprise
by only preventing it from abusing its power?
It seems to me that the answer depends upon what one puts the
stress. If one looks chiefly on the economic result in terms of market
structure, we must certainly agree with Judge Hand, and a different
treatment of monopoly cartels and single enterprises would hardly
be justified. On the other hand, if one considers chiefly the origin and
the actual behavior of a cartel as contrasted with a single enterprise,
important factual differences may often be stated.
A cartel is established by its members with the clear intent and
for the common purpose to influence the market by regulating competi-
tion exclusively to the common benefit of the cartel members. Ac-
cordingly, the cartel works for this purpose.
A single enterprise, however, need not necessarily acquire a
monopoly by restrictive activities regulating competition. Judge
Hand himself recognizes this in saying:
"It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a monopoly,
that it 'monopolized' the ingot market; it may not have achieved
monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it. If it had
been a combination of existing smelters which united the whole
industry and controlled the production of all aluminum ingot, it
would certainly have 'monopolized' the market. In several de-
cisions the Supreme Court has decreed the dissolution of such
combinations, although they engaged in no unlawful trade
practices. ."
But even where monopoly "involuntarily" arises from the combination
of existing facilities, there is present the agreement to combine. Al-
though the court obviously inclines to adopt the economic result ap-
proach, the decision is still based upon the Cardozo doctrine, in other
words upon the actual behavior of Alcoa. 45
242. Id. at 427-28.
243. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946),
and other cases discussed at p. 655 mpra.
244. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). (Emphasis
added.)
245. "Alcoa's size was 'magnified' to make it a 'monopoly'; indeed, it has never
been anything else; and its size, not only offered it an 'opportunity for abuse', but it
'utilized' its size for 'abuse', as can easily be shown ... ."Id. at 430.
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In the second Alcoa case,2 46 the district court continues to follow
the new line. "[T]he mere existence of what is denominated 'monop-
oly power', irrespective of its exercise, may be the focal element that
will resolve the outcome of a particular suit" and "is some indication
of illegality." 1 Thus, this court is even more inclined to adopt the
"mere size" doctrine, considering the result rather than the behavior
of the monopoly enterprise.
It would seem that the answer to the problem should be found
by going back to the proper purpose of the Sherman Act as well as
the German draft law: to maintain competition and private initiative
to the utmost extent under modern conditions. This certainly in-
cludes the protection of the public as to the price advantages which
ordinarily are the consequence of price competition between several
manufacturers. It includes, furthermore, the protection of the pub-
lic and the country against interference by powerful private enter-
prises. It finally includes the protection of smaller business and new-
comers. Monopoly is obviously incompatible with that.
However, there is one situation where monopoly may lie in the
interest of the consumer: if technical conditions of production are such
as to offer substantial economies of scale throughout the whole region
of possible industry outputs.248 Under such circumstances, the com-
modity in question can be produced in an economical way-namely in
the cheapest way possible-only if production is concentrated in a
few or in one firm.
It is obvious that there may occur very few cases where the
relationship between the size of the market and the economies of
scale are such as to allow the operation of one firm only. Therefore,
the argument is much more important for oligopolies. The American
automobile market is generally quoted as an example of gains in
efficiency caused by large-scale production.
For these reasons, the decisive factor should not be so much
the origin and market behavior of a monopoly or oligopoly enterprise,
but rather the possible economic, social and sometimes even political
results of monopoly and-to a lesser extent-oligopoly which are gen-
erally recognized to be detrimental to the public. Whatever view one
may take, bigness of an enterprise, if resulting in monopoly, seems
to be as much a danger as a monopoly cartel as long as no social
economies of scale are involved.
246. United States v. Aluminum Co., 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
247. Id. at 341, 342.
248. See, e.g., STIGLBR, THn THEORY op PRIcA 223-24 (1952); Lutz, Einwaende
gegen die Wettbewerbsordimng, 5 Ono 245, 257-58 (Germany 1953).
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Without that important qualification this has been expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court itself in the American Tobacco
case,"" where the Court cites with approval the significant wording
of the first Alcoa case and applies it to the cigarette monopoly cartel.
Apart from that situation, it probably would rarely happen that monop-
oly is "thrust upon" an enterprise. s ° Therefore, such "involuntary"
monopoly should not be overemphasized.
Summarizing: the German draft law seems to take a different
view of "mere size" than have the courts of the United States since
1932. It seeks only to prevent the abuse of monopoly and oligopoly
power and therefore treats differently cartels-which are prohibited
per se--and monopoly and oligopoly enterprises.251  To the extent that
article 17 implicitly includes the toleration of "big business" based on
substantial economies of scale, it would seem not to be objectionable.
A further remarkable difference lies in the remedies available.
The draft law provides for the prohibition by the Cartel Author-
ity of three enumerated restrictive practices. It contains no ma-
chinery for dissolution of monopoly enterprises into independent
units or for divestiture. Here again, the attitude taken by the courts
of the United States is different. Several important divestiture proceed-
ings were ordered in the United States in recent years in order to
deprive the defendant of the gains of its violations (so-called "fruits"
theory). Injunctions were held several times an insufficient remedy.
Courts sought more and more to reduce monopoly power to im-
potence 25
Altogether, article 17 of the draft law is the first German attempt
to deal effectively with single monopoly and oligopoly enterprises.
It goes much further than section 10 of the Cartel Ordinance of 1923
which, moreover, was seldom applied by the implementing agencies.
253
It will become a matter of great interest to see how the administration
of article 17 will work.
2 54
249. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-15 (1946).
250. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
251. Approved crisis, rationalization and export cartels (articles 2-5) which
acquire monopoly power also are subject to the regulation of article 17. Draft Law
art. 6. Thus, monopoly cartels, as far as they will be permitted by the Cartel Authority,
have the same position as monopoly enterprises.
252. See survey on this development in the second Alcoa case. United States v.
Aluminum Co., 91 F. Supp. 333, 342-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188-91 (1944).
253. See pp. 639-40 supra.
254. For a detailed discussion, see AxsmR, DAs MARXEMhEH RRSCHENDEUNTER-
NEHMEN (The Market Dominating Enterprise) (1956).
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Mergers
The regulation with respect to enterprises which dominate the
market, however, is subject to one important modification under the
draft law. It aims at preventing monopolies achieved through mergers.
There are, of course, different legal techniques available to arrive
at this purpose. The law itself may declare unlawful such a merger
and authorize the agency to enforce compliance after the merger. This
is the solution provided in sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act.2 5
The German administration has chosen another technique. Article
18(1) makes every planned merger subject to prior approval by the
Cartel Authority
"if as a consequence of it the combined enterprises would, with
regard to a certain type of goods or commercial services, ac-
quire the position of an enterprise which dominates the market
within the meaning of Art. 17(1) " and this situation would
not be of a local nature only." 257
In effect, however, a merger with such a result in the national
territory may not be approved, for article 18 further provides:
"The Cartel Authority may approve a merger of the nature
specified in Para. (1), only if it determines that the combined
enterprises do not thereby acquire with regard to certain goods
or commercial services within the territory of the Federal Republic
the position of an enterprise which dominates the market within
the meaning of Art. 17, Para. (1)." 25
Although the German statute requires prior approval, the com-
panies planning to merge, of course, may come to the conclusion that
their merger would not result in domination of the market and may
decide to merge without prior approval at the risk of subsequent dis-
solution.2 59 For the draft law contains no general obligation to inform
the Cartel Authority of every planned merger.260  In doubtful cases,
however, businessmen probably will not assume such considerable
risks but will apply for prior approval of the planned merger.
255. 38 STAr. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
256. See pp. 670-77 supra. Article 18(4) and (5) of the Draft Law contain
further details as to the scope of article 17(1) and (2). Article 18(5) provides that the
permission may be granted subject to limitations, conditions and requirements and may
be revoked if obtained by unlawful means such as fraud or threats.
257. Draft Law art. 18(1).
258. Id. art. 18(2).
259. Id. art. 20.
260. With respect to the United States, see H.R. 6748, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955)
(the new Patman Bill of June 9, 1955, to amend §§ 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act to
provide for prior notification and suspension of certain acquisitions, mergers and con-
solidations).
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Advance clearance of American mergers by the Antitrust Division
is now also possible, 6 ' but if denied by the Division creates a serious
problem for the applicants. The great practical advantage of the Ger-
man draft law lies in the fact that advance disapproval of the planned
merger is an administrative ruling subject to review and final tests in
the courts.
Once a merger has been approved by the Cartel Authority, the
merged enterprises cannot ever be dissolved or deconcentrated later.
Such approved combined enterprises are only subject to the control
of the Cartel Authority against abuses of their power as provided in
article 17262
The present wording of article 18 applies to monopoly mergers
only. However, it seems desirable and of consequence that planned
mergers which would lead to an oligopolistic market or to the further
concentration of an already existing oligopoly market, should also be
made subject to prior approval by the Cartel Authority. Without such
a provision, the number of competitors may be lessened to a point where
parallel behavior and cooperation become practicable and likely, so that
the quantitative change in the number of enterprises brings about a
qualitative change in the structure of the market. Thus, mergers
leading to concentration in oligopoly markets may lessen competition
just as monopoly mergers necessarily do.
Although the administration has recognized the dangers arising
from oligopoly enterprises and introduced an additional clause sub-
jecting oligopolies to article 17,2" it did not amend the merger regula-
tion of article 18 in a similar way. A difficulty lies in the fact that the
oligopoly clause as introduced in article 17 could not be made ap-
plicable to mergers, for the Cartel Authority cannot predict whether
the merged enterprises would "cooperate" with other enterprises "by
parallel behavior so as to affect the market substantially." 264 Perhaps
for this reason, the Economic Policy Committee of the Lower House
proposed that planned mergers shall be subject to prior approval by the
Cartel Authority if, as a consequence of the merger, "for factual rea-
sons, substantial competition" would be "excluded." 6'
However, the meaning of the phrase "for factual reasons" is not
clear. Furthermore, in many cases, there is only a probability that
261. Barnes, Theory and Practice of Anti-Trust Administration, in How To Com-
PLY WITR THs ANTI-TRUsT LAWS 37, 41 (Van Cise & Dunn eds. 1954).
262. See p. 671 supra.
263. See pp. 670-71 mrpra.
264. Draft Law art. 17(2).
265. For the German wording of this proposal to article 18, see 6 W.W. 27-28
(Germany 1956). For an English translation of the Committee's version of article 17(2)
(oligopoly clause), see note 235 supra.
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"substantial competition would be excluded." Therefore, the wording
of section 7 of the Clayton Act, "may be substantially to lessen com-
petition," seems to be a much more appropriate solution for this point.
With respect to planned mergers where one of the participating
enterprises already holds a dominating position, article 18(3) pro-
vides:
"Paras. (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis if an
enterprise which participates in a merger, with respect to a certain
type of goods or commercial services, already holds a market
dominating position within the meaning of article 17, Para. (1)
and that position is strengthened by such merger."
Here, too, an amendment to include mergers that would lead to an
oligopoly market or to the further concentration of an already existing
oligopoly market seems desirable and of consequence.
A merger without permission of the Cartel Authority is not illegal
per se, but the Cartel Authority may order rescission.26" This is the
only instance of deconcentration provided in the German draft law.
The Cartel Authority, either ex officio or if an enterprise applies
for a permission to merge under article 18, may request the necessary
information 2. and conduct any investigation and collect all evidence
deemed necessary."' Thus, there seems to be no problem of insuffi-
cient information or investigation powers under the German draft law.
But, what is to be regarded as a merger? The draft law contains
a broad definition which might be of interest for the American lawyer:
"As a merger within the meaning of article 18 shall be con-
sidered:
1. the acquisition of ownership of operational facilities of
other enterprises or of a real right to usufruct them;
2. the renting or leasing of operational facilities of other
enterprises;
3. contracts providing for the assignment of the operational
facilities of other enterprises or of their management;
4. acquisition of the capital of other enterprises and acquisi-
tion of the right to usufruct other enterprises;
5. merger with other enterprises;
6. contracts with other enterprises which provide for the
pooling of profits;
266. Draft Law arts. 20, 21.
267. Draft Law art. 38.
268. Id. art. 45(1).
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7. any legal transaction by which holders of managerial posi-
tions in one firm (members of the Vorstand, managers,
members of the Aufsichtsrat, leading employees) be-
come holders of managerial positions in other firms;
8. the acquisition of interests of any kind in other enterprises,
insofar as such interests alone or in combination with
already existing interests would give the acquiring enter-
prise a dominating influence on other enterprises or
sufficient votes to block the alteration of the by-laws in
other enterprises." 2 69
Thus, the term "merger" includes in effect all kinds of horizontal and
vertical as well as conglomerate integration. The draft law hence
covers a much broader field than section 7 of the Clayton Act.
With respect to horizontal integration, the first question, then, is
the determination of the relevant market in which the participants of the
planned merger compete. If there is no pre-existing competition among
the participants, the merged companies cannot "substantially lessen
competition" (section 7 of the Clayton Act) or "acquire the position
of an enterprise which dominates the market with regard to a certain
type of goods or commercial services" (article 18 of the draft law).
In other words, integration, without more, does not violate the
statute. This has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court."'
It will also be true under the German draft law, according to the word-
ing of article 18(1) and (2). Therefore, ". . . the extent of per-
missible integration must be governed . . . by . . . circumstances of
individual cases." 71  Several factors must be considered in determin-
ing the "market." First, the relevant geographical area must be ascer-
tained. The draft law, in this connection, provides that the Cartel
Authority may not approve a merger if the resulting combination
would dominate the market "within the territory of the Federal Re-
public." 272 Furthermore, permission is required for every merger
which results in market domination "not of a local nature only." 273
In the United States, the situation seems at first somewhat different.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act formulates: "in any section of the coun-
try." And referring to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court said:
"[W]e have consistently held that where the relevant competitive
market covers only a small area the Sherman Act may be invoked to
269. Id. art. 19.
270. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). As to the Sherman Act,
see same view in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948).
271. Id. at 526.
272. Draft Law art. 18(2). (Emphasis added.)
273. Id. art. 18(1).
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prevent unreasonable restraints within that area." 274 In effect, how-
ever, there may be no real difference between these American provisions
and article 18 of the German draft law. For, what may be considered
a "small" area in the big United States, will be generally an area "not
of a local nature only" in Germany.
Secondly, the relevant time must be determined. 5
Thirdly, the market has to be determined with respect to the
products in which the participants compete prior to the merger.27 6
In this connection, the draft law specifies: "with regard to a certain
type of goods or commercial services." 277 This definition seems to
cover not only particular goods or services, but also-within the
limits of the term "type"-substitutes.
Again, it is interesting to look on recent American decisions. A
review shows that the federal courts considered substitute competition
depending on the varying circumstances of each case. In the first
Alcoa case, 78 the relevant market for measuring Alcoa's power was
held to be the market for "virgin" aluminum, and the court refused
to consider the close competition offered by used aluminumY.17  This
narrow interpretation of substitute competition was apparently based
on the fact that Alcoa, by its monopoly on virgin aluminum, was also
able to control the supply of used aluminum.
In the Columbia Steel case,2 ° the Supreme Court found no un-
reasonable restraint of competition in the acquisition by United States
Steel of a pipe steel fabricator because pipe and structural steel was not
of the "same type," and pipe produced by United States Steel were not
used for the same purposes as pipe produced by the fabricator, and was
cheaper to produce.8 ' As to rolled steel products, the Court accepted
"as the relevant competitive market the total demand for rolled steel
products in the eleven state area." "m And, in the International Shoe
case,28 in determining whether competition was substantially lessened
by a merger, the Court inquired whether the competing products of
274. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519 (1948).
275. Cf. id. at 533.
276. Since the same problem arises with respect to monopoly and oligopoly enter-
prises under article 17(1) and (2), the discussion on the relevant market is not confined
to the merger problem only.
277. Draft Law arts. 17(1), 18(1), (2).
278. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424-26 (2d Cir. 1945).
279. Id. at 424-26.
280. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
281. Id. at 515-18, 530.
282. Id. at 512.
283. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 295-97 (1930).
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the merged companies were distributed in the same markets, i.e., by the
same class of dealers and to the same class of consumers, and by the
same trade policies.
In the Cellophane case, 8 4 the Court found substitute competition
between cellophane and other flexible wrapping materials. The Court
looked to the cross-elasticity of demand between the products, which
measures the responsiveness of the sales of one product to price
changes of the other, stating that "no more definite rule can be de-
clared than that the commodities reasonably interchangeable by con-
sumers for the same purposes make up . . ." the relevant market.28 5
This modern economic test as applied by the Supreme Court
would seem to be of particular interest for the future German practice
under articles 17 and 18 of the draft law. Having determined the
relevant market as to geographic area, time and products in which
the participants of the planned merger compete, the Cartel Authority
will proceed to determine the extent to which the participants actually
compete in this area, time, and in these products. In other words, it
must inquire whether the abolition of this competition by merger would
enable the merged companies "to dominate the market."
Here again, the question arises what factors are to be considered
decisive to determine the "loss" in competition. The draft law an-
swers this question at least partly in articles 18 and 17(1) : the share
of the market dominated by the merged companies, their resultant
power to determine production, prices or terms of sale for certain goods
or 'services, and their consequent relative ability to disregard com-
petitors, and the power thereby to influence the market tangibly. This
enumeration, however, is not exclusive under the wording of article
17(1) 286
This test seems to correspond in substance with the so-called fore-
closure-volume test which the Supreme Court set up in the Columbia
Steel case:
"In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we
do not think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling signifi-
cance; we look rather to the percentage of business controlled, the
strength of the remaining competition, whether the action springs
from business requirements [economies of scale] or purpose to
monopolize, the probable development of the industry, consumer
demands, and other characteristics of the market. We do not
undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures. ,, 287
284. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
285. Id. at 400.
286. See pp. 670-71 supra.
287. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). See also the
remarkable dissenting opinion of justice Douglas to the general problem of bigness
and market definition. Id. at 534-40.
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Intent or purpose to monopolize are irrelevant under the draft law
because it does not contain criminal provisions. Furthermore, it should
be emphasized that the German draft does not make the legality of
mergers dependent on reasonableness. Permission is to be denied to
any merger which would result in domination of the national market.
Thus, under the draft law the Cartel Authority may not consider
economies of scale which may make certain mergers desirable for
efficiency reasons.28
Violations Punishable by Administrative Fines2""
As already mentioned, the draft law does not regard violations as
a criminal offense. Accordingly, it was not necessary to make a viola-
tion dependent on the proof of intent or purpose. In the United States,
presumably the requirement of intent results from the realization that
imposition of penalties upon conduct not designed to injure commerce
would give rise to resentment. Today, most people in Germany do
not really regard violations of economic laws in the same light as
traditional criminal offenses, such as theft or fraud.29 In some cases
it may be the economic result rather than a certain individual behavior
which leads to antitrust suits. 29 ' And as explained, 292 there is hesi-
tancy, even under a civil statute, to interfere vigorously with enterprises
which owe their bigness to their efficiency or particular situations pre-
vailing in a market.
The ultimate reason for such scruples is probably the dilemma of
any free market economy and any system based on freedom: that it
cannot desist from balancing the freedoms upon which it is based
simply in order to maintain them. It is not really the problem of no
freedom for the enemies of freedom, for one who wants "economic
security" need not necessarily be an enemy of freedom. The problem
rather is to find the proper balance between freedom to compete and
to trade and freedom to contract and to combine; they are only
different forms of freedom to act and both are justified.
288. See p. 674 supra.
289. See Rasch, Zu den Strafbestimmungen des Kartellgesetzentwurfs, 5 W.W.
132 (Germany 1955).
290. Official Explanation 21-22, reprinted in 2 W.W. 471 (Germany 1952). For the
same reason, the government already enacted, e.g., the Economic Penal Code (Wirt-
schaftsstrafgesetz) of July 9, 1954, [1954] B.G.B. pt. I, at 715 (Germany), which-
like an earlier code replaced by this law-differentiates between "criminal" and"economic" offenses.
291. See the consideration of this question in United States v. Aluminum Co., 148
F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945), discussed at pp. 672-74 mtpra.
292. See p. 675 supra.
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However, in spite of its civil character, the draft law cannot fail
to provide measures against violators of its provisions. Part II
(articles 31-35) of the proposed law, therefore, provides for so-called
"administrative fines" (Geldbussen)-as distinguished from criminal
fines (Geldstrafen)-of up to 1,000,000 Deutsche Mark for violations
of the law. Such administrative fines may be imposed upon a person
who wilfully or, in some cases, negligently violates provisions of the
proposed law in a manner defined in detail in articles 31 to 35. Only
to this extent must intent or negligence be proved.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DRAFT LAW
Parts III and IV of the proposed law (articles 36-72) regulate
in detail the establishment and jurisdiction of the Cartel Authorities
and the administrative and court proceedings.293
Organization and Jurisdiction of the Cartel Authorities
All functions and powers assigned to the "Cartel Authority" pur-
suant to the law shall be exercised by two agencies, namely either by
the Federal Cartel Office or by the Supreme Land (state) Authority
to be established in each of the nine Liinder. Both authorities are
administrative agencies and are organized and proceed as such.
The Federal Cartel Office is to be established as an independent
federal agency (Bundesoberbehiirde) 294 subject to the Federal Minister
of Economics.295 Its members may not be owners, managers or direc-
tors of an enterprise, cartel or economic or professional association.
290
The Office has its own budget as part of the budget of the Federal
Ministry of Economics. 9 The Office must publish an annual report
concerning its activities and the situation and developments in its field.
Also, it must currently publish its decisions and regulations298
The establishment of the Supreme Land (state) Authorities is left
to the individual Liinder. They will probably appoint their respective
Land ministers of economics to exercise the powers locally.299
293. See Official Explanation 41-49; Kreifels, Verfahreiuvorschriften im Ent.wnrf
des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen, 9 Nz-m JuxasTiscHr* WOCHIN-
SCmrIFT 936 (Germany 1956); Thomae, Die Verfahrensvorschriften des Kartellges-
etzentwurfes, 6 W.W. 393 (Germany 1956).
294. Cf. Basic Law (the German Constitution) for the Federal Republic of
Germany of May 8, 1949, art. 87(3), [1949] B.u.B. pt. I, at 1 (Germany).
295. Draft Law art. 40(1).
296. Id. art. 40(2).
297. Id. art. 40(4).
298. Id. art. 41.
299. Official Explanation 22, reprinted in 2 W.W. 472 (Germany 1952).
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The jurisdiction of the agencies is distributed as follows. The
Federal Cartel Office decides:
(i) petitions for permission of crisis, certain rationalization and
export cartels;
(ii) the annulment of resale price fixing agreements in accord-
ance with article 12;
(iii) the permission and dissolution of mergers pursuant to
articles 18-21; and
(iv) in all other "cases where the effect of the influence on the
market or of the activities which are in restraint of com-
petition or of a discriminatory nature extend beyond the
territory of one Land." "'
The Supreme Land Authority decides in all other cases, i.e.,
where the Federal Cartel Office is not expressly given jurisdiction
as enumerated3
0 1
Under article 38, the cartel agencies may, to the extent to which
it is necessary and justified in order to accomplish the purposes of the
draft law, request every enterprise and cartel to give information con-
cerning its cost accounting methods, operating equipment, terms and
conditions, prices, pricing methods, participations, license agreements,
profits and productivity. The cartel agencies may also demand infor-
mation from economic and professional associations concerning their
by-laws and resolutions and the number and names of their members3
0 2
Finally, the cartel agencies may, in connection with crisis and certain
rationalization cartels" ° and with enterprises which dominate the
market,304 eramine any matters subject to compulsory information
under the Ordinance on Auskunftspflicht (obligation to give informa-
tion) .305
Administrative Proceedings
Proceedings Before the Cartel Authorities
The Cartel Authority may institute proceedings ex officio or upon
demand of any third party." 6 Participants in the proceedings are those
who are authorized to demand the institution of proceedings, the
300. Draft Law art. 36(1) 1.
301. Id. art. 36(1) 2; cf. id. arts. 36(2), (3), 37.
302. Cf. id. art. 26.
303. Id. arts. 2, 4.
304. Id. art. 17.
305. Verordnung uber Auskunftspflicht of July 13, 1923, [1923] R.G.B. pt. I,
at 723 (Germany).
306. Draft Law art. 42(1).
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cartel, enterprise, professional or economic association against which
the proceedings are directed, and persons who are invited by the
Cartel Authority to participate in the proceedings on the grounds that
their legal interests are affected by the decision.
0 7
The cartel agency must give the participants the opportunity to
state their views, and upon application of one of them, grant a hear-
ing.0 8 It may conduct any investigations and collect all evidence
deemed necessary.309 It may also seize material which might be of
importance as evidence for the investigation.1 0 Pending a final deci-
sion, the cartel agency may issue temporary injunctions."1 ' The cartel
agency must publish final decisions in the Bundesanzeiger and state the
reasons for its decision.
312
Appeals
Any decision of the cartel agency (e.g., permission of a crisis
cartel, its revocation, its amendment, permission of a merger, dissolu-
tion of a merger, imposition of an administrative fine) may be appealed
to the Oberlandesgericht (state appellate court), which has exclusive
jurisdiction. New evidence can be introduced on appeal.313
An appeal may be filed by any party to the proceedings before the
Cartel Authority and by any person directly affected by the decision.
314
The appeal must be filed with the Cartel Authority whose decision is
being contested within a month from service of the decision. It must
be substantiated within one month from the date of the appeal.' 15
The appellate court decides after a hearing which can be waived
with the consent of the parties. 1 ' It inquires into the facts ex officio
and is not bound by the statement of the parties. 17 The court decides
by way of order (Beschluss) and must write an opinion. 18
Appeals on Points of Law
From decisions of the Oberlandesgerichte a petition for review on
points of law may be filed to the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme
307. Id. art. 42(2).
308. Id. art. 44.
309. Id. art. 45.
310. Id. art. 46.
311. Id. art. 47.
312. Id. art. 48.
313. Id. art. 49(1).
314. Id. art. 49
315. Id. art. 52.
316. Id. art. 55.
317. Id. art. 56.
318. Id. art. 57.
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Court) if the state appellate court grants permission. Such permis-
sion may be granted only if the case is of fundamental importance; it
must be granted by the appellate court if its decision is not in accord
with any decision of the Federal Supreme Court or any other state
appellate court.3 19  However, if the state appellate court does not
grant permission to appeal, no petition for certiorari to the Federal
Supreme Court appears possible, even if the state appellate court mis-
takenly believes that its decision is in accord with decisions of the
Federal Supreme Court.32
The appeal may be filed by the Cartel Authority or any affected
party to the appellate proceedings. This appeal may be based only on
questions of the cartel law. 21
Civil Actions
Article 28 provides:
"Any person who intentionally or negligently violates any
provisions of this law or any ruling of the Cartel Authority or
of the appellate court issued pursuant to this law, shall, if such
provision or decision has the purpose to protect any other person,
be liable to such person for damages caused by such violation." "
For such private (civil) actions the Landgerichte (state district courts)
have exclusive jurisdiction.3 The court must give notice to the
Federal Cartel Office of all proceedings relating to the cartel law. 24
Furthermore, the provisions of the German Civil Code-in par-
ticular sections 138, 823 and 826 " -and of the Law Against Unfair
Competition-in particular section 1 2 0-and any other provision deal-
ing with regulation of trade are applicable.
Summary
On the whole, the execution shows the following:
(i) appropriate distribution of the competences between the
Federal Cartel Office and the Supreme Land Authorities;
319. Id. art. 59.
320. Cf. decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Zivilsenat), April 23, 1951, 2
B.G.H.Z. 16. This case was decided under the corresponding general provision of the
German Civil Procedure Code. ZIVILPROZUSSORDNUNG § 546 (2).
321. Draft Law art. 60.
322. Cf. id. arts. 22, 30.
323. Id. art. 63.
324. Id. art. 65.
325. Quoted and discussed at pp. 632-34 and in note Ill supra.
326. Ibid.
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(ii) concentration over all legal matters with the ordinary courts
(state district, state appellate, Federal Supreme Court) rather than
administrative courts;
(iii) jurisdiction of the ordinary appellate courts for all appeals;
(iv) concentration of this jurisdiction with a few appellate
courts; 32
(v) review on points of law of important decisions of the ap-
pellate courts by the Federal Supreme Court;
(vi) constitution of a special cartel senate at the appellate
courts and at the Federal Supreme Court.32 ' The proposed law thereby
hopes to meet the problem of judges trained well enough to handle anti-
trust suits. The difficulties involved in antitrust suits require judges
highly qualified both in law and economics. Such judges are rare.
Therefore the draft law provides for the establishment of cartel sen-
ates (in Germany, every appellate court and the Federal Supreme is
divided into several senates consisting of five judges each). The
judges appointed to these cartel senates are to be men particularly
experienced and really prepared to deal with antitrust suits.
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss also in detail
the differences existing between the administration and proceedings
of the statutes in both of the countries. Some of these differences are
quite obvious. Most of them have their origin in the different legal
and administrative systems of the two countries.
However, one basic difference may be stated briefly: "In accord-
ance with a long tradition of positive state control over economic
affairs, the German bill places great emphasis on the preventive and
permissive functions of public authority. It balances a far-reaching
anti-monopoly and anti-cartel policy with an equally far-reaching
discretion of the cartel authority (Kartellbehoerde) to sanction certain
agreements which are prohibited in principle, and other departures
from the law where certain considerations of public policy require or
justify such a departure." 329 "[P]ublic authorities, both administra-
tive and judicial, are given very considerable powers, far exceeding
those of their American counterparts." 380
As contrasted therewith, American law puts "all the emphasis on
the prosecution of violations of the law, civil or criminal. This of
327. See Draft Law art. 68.
328. Id. arts. 67, 70.
329. Friedmann, Anti-Monopoly Law--Some Comparative Observations, in
FrsTsCHRIV FuR ERNST RABEL 453, 468 (Doelle, Rheinstein & Zweigert eds. 1954).
330. Id. at 463.
688 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
necessity means a discriminatory and selective administration of the
law. Certain cases are selected according to considerations which are
largely of a discretionary character. It is an open question how the
German practice will develop. . . . No law has as yet attempted what
the German Bill sets out to do." "' It is true, the German courts will
have the last word. But it would seem to be doubtful whether their
influence will be as great as that of the American courts.
Another important difference lies in the fact that the German
Attorney General and the district attorneys have no power to file anti-
trust proceedings under the draft law. That power rests exclusively
with the cartel authorities. There is no other agency except the
independent Federal Cartel Office and -the Supreme Land Authorities,
which have different functions in the execution of the law. The power
of the Linder (states) are based upon articles 83 and 84 of the Basic
Law (the German Constitution). 2 Thus, there is no concurrent
jurisdiction over the proposed law.
As contrasted therewith, the Clayton Act provides in sections 2,
3, 7 and 8 that both the Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney
General may take action. It will probably be an advantage that the
German draft law does not grant such concurrent jurisdiction to two
different agencies. Conflicts of jurisdiction and different interpre-
tations of the same law will thereby be prevented.
CONCLUSION
The German Draft Law against Restraints of Competition is in
substance based upon the economic theory and policy of Walter Eucken
and his so-called "Freiburg School," ' on the one hand, and upon the
experience of the United States during the last sixty years, on the
other. The American influence has been effective mainly through the
Allied decartelization laws and their interpretation,3 4 but even more by
direct theoretical and practical studies of American antitrust law by
the "German Commission To Study Cartel and Monopoly Problems in
331. Id. at 475.
332. See note 294 supra.
333. Franz B6hm, Grossmann-Doerth, A. Lampe, Friedrich A. Lutz, K. F. Maier,
Fritz W. Meyer, Leonhard Miksch and others. See the basic work, EucKEN, GRUND-
SAZ DER WIRTSCHATSPOLrIIK (Principles of Economic Policy) (1952). For a recent
example, see Lutz, Bemerkungen rum Monopolproblem, 8 ORo 19 (Germany 1956).
334. See, e.g., KRONSTEIN, NEUE DEUTSCHE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTLICHE ENTSCHEI-
DUNGEN mi LICHTE DES AMERIKANISCHEN ANTITRUSTRECHTS (New German Court
Decisions Reviewed Under American Antitrust Law) (1953) and sources cited in
Fikentscher, Die deutsche Kartellrechtswissenschaft 1945-1954, Eine kritische Uber-
sicht, 5 W.W. 205, 206 n.5, 208 (Germany 1955).
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the United States" " and otherwise. 36  A third decisive factor has
been Germany's own experience with the traditional European concept
of "cartel control" between 1923 and 1945. Thus, the draft law is
based to a considerable extent upon comparative studies.1
7
A comparison of the two laws shows indeed a considerable simi-
larity of the underlying policy and the basic concepts. In this light, the
existing differences would seem to be of minor importance. However,
they should be by no means overlooked and they can be reduced only
in part under the different legal systems of the two countries.
The draft law is a modern statute with all advantages deriving
therefrom. Thus, it was possible to regulate numerous restrictive
business practices in one statute. The basic construction and the
systematic and relatively clear language of the proposed law would
seem to be positive and helpful factors in its application. At the same
time, the draft law seeks to be in most cases as detailed and exact as
possible. It seeks to provide for the cartel authorities and courts real
guideposts and, thus, to ease and to secure the execution of its clearly
expressed purposes.
An even more detailed regulation and more exact definitions would
hardly be possible and appropriate in the long run. Any regulation of
trade will have to deal with developments, factual situations and their
evaluation which cannot be determined, defined and exactly regulated
in advance by statutory provisions. s8
335. Cf. Vorlilfiger Bericht (Preliminary Report) der deutschen Kommission
szom Studium von Kartell und Monopolfragen in den Vereinigten Staate;, Bundesan-
zeiger No. 250 of Dec. 29, 1950, app.
336. From May 17 to July 17, 1954, a new three men study group was in the
United States. See the reports of two of its members: Meyer-Cording, Zur heutigen
Situation in Antitrustrecht, Eindrucke von einer Studienreise nach den U.S.A., Bundes-
anzeiger No. 193 of Oct. 7, 1954, app.; Kamberg, Wirtschaftliche Massmhinen utd
Erfahrungen, Die amerikanische Anti-Trust Gesetzgebung, Bundesanzeiger No. 6 of
Jan. 11, 1955, app.
337. Fikentscher, Die deutsche Kartellrechtswssenschaft 1945-1954, Eine kritische
Ubersicht, 5 W.W. 205, 207 (Germany 1955). A comprehensive study on the draft law
itself as compared with the present American antitrust law has not yet been published.
For more general and brief surveys, see Friedmarn, Anti-Monopoly Law-Some
Comparative Observations, in FtsTscmrT Fil- ERNST RAn_ 453 (Doelle, Rheinstein
& Zweigert eds. 1954) and Fikentscher, die neuere Entwicklung des amerikanischen
Wettbewerbsrechts und der deutsche Kartellgesetsentwurf, 17 Z.G.H.K. 1 (Germany
1955). Besides there already exists several articles on specific questions. Most of them
(as far as published until 1954) are cited in Fikentscher, Die deutsche Kartellrecht-
swissenschaft 1945-1954, Eine kritische Ubersicht, 5 W.W. 205, 208 n.18 (Germany
1955).
338. With respect to atomic industry, in contrast to the American statute of 1954,
the new atomic draft law of the German federal administration (Entwurf eines
Gesetzes ueber die Erzeugumg und Nutzung von Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen
ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz)) does not provide for public property of atomic energy,
but merely for an elaborate system of federal and state controls including government
administered depots for certain atomic materials. Thus, the atomic draft law claims
to be based on the principles of a "free and social market economy." See Kruse, Zum
Atomgesetz-Entunrf der Bundesregierung, 11 D.B. 740 (Germany 1956). The anti-
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Apart from that, the quality and reasonableness of the principles
and regulations cannot be judged until cartel authorities and courts
begin to work with the statute.
However, in the long run an appropriate application of the pro-
posed law will depend less on its quality and the capability of its execu-
tors than on the belief of the German people in the necessity of free
competition as the type of an economy which promotes best the indi-
vidual and common welfare. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that
such belief is already widespread. A look in the current German anti-
trust literature reveals serious controversies on basic questions. Never-
theless, it cannot be overlooked that the great success of the free market
economy from 1948 till today is strengthening the number and power
of its partisans.
trust draft law does not provide for any exception of the future atomic industry from
its regulations. Thus, atomic industry at present would seem to fall finder the anti-
trust draft law like any other industry not expressly exempted. See Gleiss, Atom-
energie and Kartellrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land (Atomic Energy Law and Antitrust Law in the United States and the Federal
Republic), 9 NEUE: JuIRISTIscHE WOCHENSCuRiFr 819 (Germany 1956). The supra-
national aspects of the problem will of course have considerable influence on the legal
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